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INTRODUCTION
George McCarthy, a third-country (Jamaican) national,
and husband wished to stay with his wife Sheila and their
children in the United Kingdom.' The Court of Justice of the
European Union ("CJEU") in effect answered the UK court's
referral question about Mrs. McCarthy's right to reside in the
United Kingdom in the following way. Mrs. McCarthy as a
citizen of the European Union has no independent right to
reside in the United Kingdom under treaty provisions2 because
that would involve letting her husband stay in the United
Kingdom. The heart of the case, according to the CJEU, is that
"[n] o element of the situation of Mrs. McCarthy, as described by
the national court, indicated that the national measure at
issue ... has the effect of depriving her of the genuine
enjoyment of the substance of the rights associated with her
status as a Union citizen."3 Equally important to the Court was
the contrast with Ruiz Zambrano: "the national measure ... in
the present case [leading to the deportation of George
McCarthy] does not have the effect of obliging Mrs. McCarthy to
leave the territory of the EU."4 She and their children may
choose to remain without the husband and father of the family,
if she so wishes. The family's break up, if Mrs. McCarthy chooses
1. imitry Kochenov & Richard Plender, EU Citizenship: From an ncipient Form to an
Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text, 37 EU' R. L. REV. 69, 389-90) (2012).
Sheila McCarthy, a dual UK and Irish citizen working at home by taking care of the
McCarthy children, did not receive help from the Court of Justice of the European Union
("CJ.EU") to stay as an intact family in the United Kingdom. The McCarthy family
Situation sheds "some light on what was actually going on. Three children, one of them
severely disabled and in need of constant care, went unreported." Id. at 389-90. Kochenov
and Plender speak of the Citizen's "right not to be pushed to leave the territory of the
Union." Id. at 387.
2. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 20, 2010 0.J. C 83/47. at 56 [hereinafter TFEU] (providing that "(1) Citizenship of the
Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall
be a citizen of the Union. (2) Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this
Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby"). This provision was not part of
the Treaty of Rome (1957) but was added as an amendment to Ar ticle 8 of the EC Treaty
(one of the Treaties of Rome, 1957) in Maastricht in 1992. See also id. art. 21, at 57
(providing that " [c]v ci Citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States. subject to the limitations and conditions laid down
in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect") (emphasis added).
3. Sheila McCarthy v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-434/09. [2011]
E.C.R. 1-03375, 1 49.
4. Id. 50.
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to remain in the United Kingdom, is only collateral damage
from thejudicial decision.
In the judicial system of the European Union, the Court has
as part of its operation the help of Advocates General who set
forth a unique judicial perspective on the most pressing and
important legal problems facing the Union. With judicial status
themselves, the Advocates General contribute to the ongoing
development of the jurisprudence of the CJEU. Clarity in EU
citizenship is particularly important now when the European
Union is facing a falling and aging population, the need for
secure family unification (or reunification) of parents who are
EU citizens married to third-country nations and the necessity
for equality with respect to integration throughout the Union.
In these circumstances an increase in EU citizenship cases is no
surprise. The Advocates General have been perfectly positioned
to develop the nuances of all the legal theories for the CJEU to
take next step in the application of the principles of Union
citizenship.
To explore the inconsistencies in recent EU citizenship
cases and the potential for harmonization, this Article in Part I
sets what might otherwise seem a crisis of jurisdiction regarding
the European Union's competence in citizenship, formerly only
a Member State competence, in the historical perspective of the
long struggle of the Union and the Court to achieve that elusive
treaty vision of "ever closer union."
Part II set forth the role Advocates General play in
clarifying the underlying issues of fundamental rights reaching
across the European Union versus an internal situation relevant
only to one Member State at stake in M1fcCarthy and future cases.
This exploration of the function of the Advocates General is
necessary to lay the foundation for determining whether a
solution to the EU citizenship deficit can come from the judicial
system itself. Part III explores several questions. What barriers
obscure the vision and meaning of EU citizenship? Do babies
and children in school now receive special protection that other
citizens seemingly cannot? Is the EU citizen only a "traveling
man?" Does the Court, by relying on the laws of Member State
citizenship in accordance with the treaty, assume the
bureaucratic deficiencies of the modern administrative state?
Should the European Union now be subject to a normative
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"market" construct? Is that framework too narrow in today's
environment when democratic governments desire to be subject
to considerations of rights? In Part IV, the important question
arises: What, if any, role can the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European U.nion ("Charter of Rights"), made law by the
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009,5 play in re-orienting the vision of the
Court of Justice? What is the current vision of the Court,
including both the judges and the Advocates General, as far as
family (re)unification rights and EU citizenship are concerned?
As it stands now, the Member States intervening in ELU
citizenship cases have put their thumbprints on the vision,
clouding and obscuring the lens, with the result that
fundamental rights recede into the background and Member
States' social welfare budgets loom larger on the horizon.
I. THE EU AND CITIZENSHIP
Today the European Union and citizenship are inextricably
connected but EU citizenship was not even a glimmer in the
minds of those searching for peace after the suffering during
the Second World War (and the many preceding European
wars). The idea of Europe took various verbally expressive
forms along with different efforts to co-operate after the Second
World War.7
5. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has the force of law
under the Treaty of Iisbon's TEU art. 6. (2009). See Consolidated V ersion of the Treaty on
European Union art. 6, 2010 0.J. C 83/13 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. Article 51 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union makes it clear it does not,
rationae materiae, "extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the
Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as
defined in the Treaties." See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art.
51, 2010 OJ. C 83/389 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]. Braibant, one of the drafters of the
Charter of Rights, provides a legislative history ofArticle 51. See GLYBRAmANT, IA CHARTE
DES DROITS FONDAMLNTAUX DE LUNION EUROPLENNE: TEMOIGNAGL ET COMNIENTAIRES
251-53 (2001); see generally Grainne de Burca, The Drafting of the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights, 26 EUR. I . REV. 126 (200 1).
6. See Peter Spiegel & Richard Milne, EU' Stabiising Role Honoured, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2012, at 2; Quentin Peel, Should Bloc Have Wn ?, FN. TIMFS, Oct. 13, 2012, at 2; Gideon
Rachman, Brussels Can Share Credit with Other Candidates FIN. TINIES, Oct. 13. 2012. at 2
(explaining that America, NATO. and modernity itself helped warlike Europe to keep the
recent peace).
7. Staff Briefing, Goodbe Europe: Whiat Would Happen ifBritain Left the EU ?, ECO.NOMIST
23 (Dec. 8-14, 2012). Unlike Amierican secession followed by the Civil War, Britain would
likely have no ability to return to the Union. "And one certainty: that having once
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Throughout this period, the CJEU is considered to be
among the best vehicles for holding Europe together as people
puzzle through what Europe and the idea of Europe actually are
and can be." The court started to set up a new legal order and
construed the provisions of the Economic Community Treaty of
Rome (1957), which specifically referred to such economic
freedoms as the freedom of workers to travel from one Member
State to another for work.9 Eventually this new freedom became
a normative, market constraint. To this day, that early history
still shapes the reasoning in the cases today. The court
deliberately does not mention respect for family rights in
different cases when it can avoid doing so as "a strategic
omission" to permit the court to "avoid any charges of 'new'
competence-creating."10
departed, it would be all but impossible to get back in again." Id at 26. Similarly, David
Carncon, the coalition Prime Minister. facing divisions in his Conservative Party, has
suggested that if people rclect him in 2015, he will re-negotiate the relationship between
United Kingdom and the European Union and present the British people with a
referendum. See Cassell Bryan-Low & Nicholas Winning, UK Rethinks Ties to Euope, WAT
ST. J., Jan. 23, 2013, at Al. Business lcaders expressed concern over the long-tern
uncertainty the prospect of the United Kingdom's departure injects into the regulations
businesses would have to follow if they were to invest in the United Kingdom at this time,
suggesting that they might invest csewhere until the matter is Settled. See Cassell Bryan-
Low, UK Leader Tries to Calm EUFears over Ties, WALL ST.J., jan. 25, 2013, at A7.
8. La (our de Justice de PUnion Europcenne ("CJUE") has just celebrated its 60th
anniversary December 3-4. 2012. A serious collection of articles has accompanied the
celebration. See THE COU-RT OFJSTIC.F AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANATYSES AND
PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-AW-l-A COUR DE jUSTICE ET IA CONSTRUCTION
DE L'EUROPL: ANALYSLS ET PERSPECTIVES DL SOIXANTE ANS DL JURISPRUDENCL (Allan
Rosas, Egils Levits & Yves Bots eds., 2012).
9. See ITEU, supra note 2; van Gend cn Loos v. Ncderlandse Adninistratic der
Belastingen. Case 26/62. [1963] E.C.R. 1. Van Gend en Loos in effect opened the
preliminary reference competence to the equivalent of "private attorneys general," as in
the American case, Kardon v. National Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), by
implying a private light of action in order to carry out the purpose of the legislation (the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78, at issue in Kardon, or the treaty which
promoted the integration of Europe in van Gend en Loos). Cf. PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER &
LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THL NATIoN STATL 137-38 (2010) (explaining
that in van Gend en Loos, the CJEU "opened the door to extensive supranational judicial
intervention into national legal orders" by "recognizing the standing of private parties to
bring compliance claims" through a preliminary reference). For more on the preliminary
reference procedure, see KOEN LENAERTS & ). ARTS, PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EU 17-55,
229-43 (1999).
10. Nianh Nic Shuibhnc, (Some of) the Kids Are All Right: McCarthy & Dereci. 49
Common NIKr. L. REV. 349, 375 (2012) (referring to Ruih Zambrano). See infa notes 54-64.
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The CJEU had built up its very considerable expertise in
cases involving EU legislation dealing with the internal market.
Thus over the decades since the 1960s, the court had fairly
steadily developed the stance of an economic regulatory body. It
naturally looked to the integration of the market for its
jurisprudence. The CJEU became not just an expert at market
regulation but it also achieved a high degree of excellence and a
sound jurisprudence dealing with the sale and transport of
goods, free movement of persons for jobs, education and
professional credentialing, the provision and receipt of services
and the establishment of businesses in host Member States. For
all of these reasons the CJEU is a role model for other courts
and enjoys genuine esteem for its work.
As the importance of the Court has grown, and seemingly
along with it the scope of its competence, particularly over the
Charter of Rights" after the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the court
has not had an easy transition to covering new cases not based
on the need for market regulation. Nonetheless, fundamental
rights have always been implicated in economic values and this
has proved true as well in the legal history of the Union. The EU
has had competence in immigration law since the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1999.12 Now, however, the court is at a crossroads
11. Charter of Rights, supra note 6.
12. Even before the Treaty of Amsterdam. the CJECU dealt with fundamental rights.
See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treatics
Establishing the European Comunities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 OJ. C 340/1
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. For an example of an area that bridges the gap
between a market concept and the concept of fundamental rights, see Gillian More, The
Principle of'Equal Treatment: From Aarket Unijier to Fundanmnta Right, in THE EVOLUTION OF
EU IAw 517 (Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca eds., 1999).
Since 1969, the ( JEU has been concerned with fundamental rights arising out of
regulation of the internal market. In Stauderv. City of Ulm, the ECJ said that "fundarnental
human rights are enshrined in the general principles of [EU] law and are protected by the
Court." Stauder v. City of Ulm. Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419 1 7. The ( JEU said that it
would draw on the different constitutional traditions of the Member States when dealing as
in this case with the privacy of welfare recipients of shares of excess butter. This approach
was later codified in TEU art. 6. Thus the Court has been inspired by these Member State
traditions to create its own rights.
It took until 1973 in Nold v. Commission for the court to deal more openly with
fundamental rights. See Nold v. Comm'n, Case 4/73. [1974] E.C.R. 491. From the
beginning, one especially sensitive point has been the conflict between Member State
constitutional rights and EU law.
In Nold, EU fundamental rights were found to be very important. The E( J upheld the
rights but recognized that they are not absolute. Public interest exceptions not disturbing
2013] 1377
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because it has the Charter of Rights dangling before it as both
the sword of Damocles and a siren call.
The Member States do not wish to increase the court's
competence to review Member State legislation on fundamental
rights, particularly concerning family law and immigration. In
those areas the Member States wish to limit fundamental rights
through general exceptions couched in terms of public safety or
policy, despite their commitment to fundamental rights for the
most part. They rely on the Commission and secondary
legislation to limit the situations in which the CJEU can apply
fundamental rights in the cases before it.
The legal history of the CJEU shows in detail the challenge
before the court. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the
treaties did not yet refer to family rights, which for a time
appeared to be only the province of the European Court of
Human Rights.' Family law in relation to fundamental rights in
connection with EU citizenship presents the CJEU with a great
challenge because of arguments over the court's competence
under the Charter of Rights as well as the court's arguable lack
of familiarity and expertise in this important field. The court
takes up the challenge at the peril of legal uncertainty and even
injustice in particular cases. This construction of fundamental
rights as part of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) is still very new to
the CJEU. The CJEU and the courts of the Member States work
closely together.14 Each Member State is already bound by the
Treaty of Lisbon to observe the fundamental rights of its
citizens. The Union itself is preparing to accede to the ECHR, to
which all the Member States are already signatories. EU
citizenship cases set forth the challenge to the CJEU to make the
case for the observance of citizen's fundamental rights.
"the substance" of those rights were allowed. The court felt that Nold's trouble arose frorn
the recession and not because of the Commission's decision. According to the court. Nold
failed on the facts. In dealing with Sheila McCarthy's marriage and family life, the ECj used
virtually the same reasoning it had used in relation market and property rights in 1973 but
in 2011 it wrote is judgment without even recognizing that these fundamental rights were
central to Mrs. McCarthy's claims.
13. The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtER") was established under the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. article 8. See
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov.
4. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
14. See Andrea Biondi, How to Go Ahead as an EU Law NationalJudge 15 EUR. PUB. L.
225, 238 (2009) (noting the healthy relationship between the ECJ and the national courts).
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If "[c]itizenship is the cornerstone of (democratic)
legitimacy in a European polity (cf. arts. 9-11 TEU)'" 15 did the
choice Mrs. McCarthy had (to split up her family [by staying in
Britain] or to leave with her husband for Jamaica) "deprive
citizenship of its practical meaning" for Mrs. McCarthy?b
Citizenship developed in reaction to "the pressing legitimacy
question, as did fundamental rights in general."1 There is no
harmonization of citizenship among the Member States. The
requirements of the Member States differ from each other but
all citizens of each Member State also have Union citizenship
which they share in common but paradoxically in some cases
only when they move among Member States. In a legal analysis
of Sheila's situation, several considerations will be taken into
account in order to piece together a sense of citizenship because
the results of recent European cases are inconsistent.18 The role
of the Advocates General assigned to McCarthy and other EU
citizenship cases will be highlighted as an important part of the
dialog within the Union's judicial system.
It is time for the Court to take a step back and examine how
to continue to factor fundamental rights into its jurisprudence,
apart from the Charter of Rights which provides no new
pathways for jurisdiction. One way the CJEU may be helped to
shape its jurisprudence on further facets of EU citizenship is
through the opinions of its Advocates General. The CJEU needs
to be willing to deal more concretely with how family law and
15. Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Kottman, Carlino Antpohler, Johanna
Disckschen, Simon Hentrel & Maja Snkolj, Reverse Solange: Protecting the Essence of
Fundarmental Rights Against EUi embner States, 49 CO\MMON MKI. L. REV 489, 502 (2012)
(citing Anne Leva de, Citoennet de lUon Euopenne etIdentite Consttutionelle 18 REV. DES
AFFAIRLS EUROPlENNLS 98 (2011)).
16. Id. at501.
17. Id. at 506 (explaining that citizenship and fundamental lights are "two mutually
strengthening concepts which essentially pursue the very same objective, i.e. to bring the
Union closer to the individual" (citing Siofra O'Leary, The Relationship between Comnnunit
Citizenship and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Comm).unit Law, 32 C ONINON MIKI. L.
RLV. 519, 549 (1995)). Siofia O'Lear., The Past, Present andFutue of the Purely Internal Rule
in EU Law, in EMPOWERMFN AND DISEMPOHERMFNT OF THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS 37
(Michael Dougan, Niamh Nic Shuibhne & Eleanor Spaventa eds., 2012).
18. Contrast the different and arguably unfair result in McCaihy with the result in
Mary Carpenter and Catherine Zhu's cases when viewed from the point of view of the
fundamental right to family life. See Carpenter v. Sc'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C
60/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-6279; Zhu & Chen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C
200/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9925; see also Bogdandy, supra note 15, at 506.
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immigration bring fundamental rights into the questions on the
meaning of European citizenship and integration. The CJEU,
with its experience in these issues from early cases dealing with
free movement of persons, must forthrightly address rather
shirk these duties to provide guidance to Member State courts
which will continue to refer cases with ever greater frequency to
the CJEU. McCarthy avoids fundamental rights entirely and the
Grand Chamber soon afterwards treated the fundamental right
of respect for family life as an after-thought which might
concern Member State courts but not really the court itself. This
Article suggests that the Court cannot avoid facing these
questions for too much longer without risking loss of some of
the independence central to its judicial function and strong
reputation.
II. THE ROLE OF THE ADVOCATES GENERAL
Two prominent features of the EU legal system include: 1)
the preliminary reference system under Article 267 of the TFEU
by which any tribunal in a Member State may refer questions
about the interpretation of provisions of the treaties relevant to
the resolution of a case pending in that tribunal and 2) the use
of advocates general who enjoy judicial status at the court and
who play a unique role in the resolution of important cases in
the CJEU.1 Briefly, the preliminary reference system allows the
CJEU and the courts of the Member States to interact when a
tribunal in a Member State asks the CJEU for an interpretation
of a treaty provision or secondary Union legislation.
The Advocate General assigned to a case writes an opinion
exploring all the issues and delivers it to the court, which can
take the opinion into account in reaching its judgment. Is it the
role of the Advocate General assigned to a case to consider such
questions as alienation from government and the fiction that
choice, even among bad alternatives, is deemed consent in
order to prevent such a mistake from occurring? The judicial
rank of the position of Advocate General comes from French
19. See THE COURT OFJUSTICE AND THF CONSTRUCTION OF EU ROPE, supra note 9. For
a good description of this process, see GLORGE BLRMALNN, ROGLR J. GOLBEL, WILLIAM J.
DAVEY & ELLANOR M Fox, (NSES AND MATERLALS ON EUROPL\N UNION Lxw 321-48 (3d
ed., 2011).
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administrative law. Because the CJEU has no dissents, its
judgments customarily do not provide expansive reasoning on
the issues before the court. Much more leeway is available to the
Advocate General who writes an individual opinion, expansively
reasoned and sometimes including alternative arguments.20
"The opinion contains a more detailed exposition of the
factual and legal background to the case than that found in the
judgment."21 Part of the Advocate General's discretion includes
making "alternative arguments,"2 comparing the laws of
Member States to derive "a principle appropriate to [Union]
law,"2" and in dictum, to assess case law, "identifying trends,
pointing out inconsistencies which may exist, and outlining
future possible developments. In that respect, his independence
from the judges is of cardinal importance."24
A. Wading Through the Technicalities: The "Purely Internal" Doctrine
On the one hand, the Advocates General have set forth the
fundamental rights embedded in the technicalities of
regulations, directives, and other secondary legislation.25 On the
other hand, Advocates General can get too far ahead of the
court and risk not being a factor in the court's deliberations, as
20. Takis Tridimas, The Role of the Advocate General in the Development of Conmunity
Law: Some Reflections. 34 COMMON MKi. L REv. 1349, 1361 (1997). Article 167 of the EC
Treaty provided that (note the plural) Advocates General write an individual opinion. A
few months later, the Court set forth its unanimous judgment. The court may refer to the
Advocate General's opinion on particularly persuasive issues. Id. at 1358.
21. Id. at 1358-59. Tridinas enumerates four functions for the Advocate General:
assisting the court in preparing the case; proposing a solution to the case before the court;
providing legal grounds to justify the solution by rclating it to existing case law. and:
opining on incidental points of law, in particular critically assessing case law or
commentary on the development of the law in the area at issue.
22. Id. at 1359.
23. Id. at 1360.
24. Id at 1361.
25. Bogdandy, supra note 15. at 505-06; see. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
Carlos Garcia Avello v. Etat Belge, Case C,148/02. [2003] E.C.R. I-11613. 1 27 ("assess[ing]
the dispute about the composition of a surname in light of the right to a personal
identity"); Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed, Baunbast & R v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dcp't, Case C-413/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-7091. 1 58: Opinion of Advocate General
Tizzano, Kunquian Catherine Zhu & Man Lavette Chen v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dcp't, Case C-200/02. [2004] E.C.R. I-09925. 1 94; Opinion of Advocate General
Sharpston, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmanm von Wien, Case (208/09.
[2010] E.C.R. I-13693, [ 3, n. 102.
2013] 1881
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described in Part IIB below. That delicate balance comes to the
fore in cases involving rights subject to over-reaching or abuse by
Member States which can "insulate a territory or a community of
people residing in a particular place by treat them differently
from others located in the same state."26
Member States desiring to pre-empt from their citizens or
residents constitutional or fundamental rights they have sworn
to uphold are happy to argue that EU law cannot interfere.2
The CJEU would therefore have no competence (jurisdiction)
to remedy the wrong or harm the Member State is perpetrating.
Those residents or citizens preyed upon in their own Member
States are said to suffer from reverse discrimination.28 The classic
description of the harm" the "purely internal" matter can cover
over or hide is as follows. Reverse discrimination "should now be
considered a difference in treatment that falls within the general
scope of EU law, as it impedes the [EU's] now all-important aim
of ensuring that no discrimination arises as a result of the
process of European integration."so
Despite the fact that the Advocates General can be more
creative in their reasoning and discernment of the issues
embedded in a case, Advocates General are still hemmed in by a
26. Fernanda Nicola, Invisible Cities in Europe, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1282. 1297
(2012).
27. Id. (explaining that "While the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon and numerous directives
and case law have strengthened the righs of European citizens, the 'wholly internal'
situation doctrine has become an important shield to protect Member States from the
expansion of EU powers").
28. Alina Tryfonidou. Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity
in a Citizens' Europe, 35 L.AL ISSUES EiCON. INTEGlMTION 43, 63 (2008). "Reverse
discrimination arises as a result of the process of constructing an internal market and the
limited scope of application of EU law . .. " Id. AIt. 18 TFEU deals with diseimination and
the concept of reverse discrimination lits in here. See Anne Pieter van der Met, The Outer
Limits of the Prohibition on Grounds of Nationalit: A Look through the Lens of Union Citizenship,
18 MAASTRICHTJ. EUR. & COMP. L. 62 (2011).
29. The purely internal Member-State situation is not always harmiul to citizens such
as when the Member State targes particularly needy groups and conmulnities wthin the
State for financial and educational grans. Students or grant seekers from other Member
States wvho object successfully to that inequality in aid may only succeed in wiping out the
limited amount of aid the State has available. Agustin Jos6 Men6ndcz, Euopean Citizenship
after Martnnez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become Aore Human but Less Social, in
THE PAST AN) FLTURE OF EU LW THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVIITFED ON THF 50TH
ANNILRSARY OF THL ROME TREATY 363, 388-92 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loic Azoulai
eds., 2010); Nicola, supra note 26, at 1356-61.
30. Tryfonidou, supra note 28, at 64.
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series of technicalities from the narrow competence of EU law
compared to the national law of the Member States and from
the conservative traditions developed in any institution such as
the CJEU. In the area of freedom of the press and media
(equivalent to the freedom in the First Amendment), the
frustrations of an overly complicated law are due in some large
part to the reluctance of Member States to cede the particular
competence to the European Union and because of their desire
not to honor those rights. The issues in several of these cases
raise the same or similar constitutional issues as McCarthy. These
frustrations include unenlightened policy of the Member State,
driven by desire to avoid the costs of social welfare, which poor
families might need, the inability of the Court to overcome or
even to face the predicament and the ill consequences for
democracy, transparency, and legitimacy.1
Centro Europa 7 illustrates this problem exquisitely. 12 AG
Miguel Poiares Maduro sets forth the problems of an
independent communications company trying to operate in a
Member State with a media mogul even more powerful than
Rupert Murdoch, namely Silvio Berlusconi, at the relevant time
for the difficulties in this case, Prime Minister of Italy. Mediaset
is owned by the Berlusconi interests. The concept of media
pluralism requires an end to the Berlusconi duopoly.3 The
media company that owns Centro Europa 7 won broadcasting
rights in a public tender procedure but the government never
assigned the company the radio frequency from which to
broadcast. At the same time the Italian government introduced
31. Other media cases wvith happier outcomes include: Vereinigte Familiapress v.
Baucr Verlag, Case C-60/00. [1997] E.C.R. 1-3689; ERT v. DEP Case C-260/89, [1991]
E.C.R. I-2925.
32. Opinion of Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro. Centro Europa 7 Srl v.
Ministero delle Corunicazioni c Autorita' per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Case C-
380/05, [2008] E.C.R. 1-349, [ 21 (explaining the possibility of a Member State's persistent
violations of fundamental rights: "I do not discount, offhand, the idea that a serious and
persistent breach of fundamental rights might occur in a Member State, making it
impossible for that State to comply wvith many of its EU obligations and effectively limiting
the possibility for individuals to benefit fully ron the rights grant to them by EU law").
33. Media pluralism is honored in such (JIUE judgmens as: Vereinigte Familiapress
Zeitungsverlags-und vertriebs (mbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Case C-368/95, [1997]
E.C.R. 1-3689 (fice expression); Centro Europa 7 Srl v. Ministero delle Comunicazioni c
Autoritl per le garanzic ndle coiunicazioni, Eur. CL. H.R. (2012) (addressing the
deprivation of the right of property to broadcast on the assigned ainvay)
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national legislation that let Mediaset continue to use the
frequency. Is the national law incompatible with Aiticle 10 of
the ECHR? How enforceable are fundamental rights in the
context of purely national situations with no cross-border
element? Do EU fundamental rights come into play only when
Member States implement EU law? This is the same troubling
issue underlying McCarthy and the same disturbing answer leaves
EU citizens unprotected.
Advocate General Maduro's analysis may be outlined as
follows: in Konstantinidis Advocate General Francis Jacobs
thought that any national who pursues economic activity in
another Member State may invoke the protection of
fundamental rights as a matter of European Union law.." The
Court did not accept that any violation at all hampers the right
to free movement.3 Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, respect for
fundamental rights is a formal legal requirement for
membership in the European Union.36 Article 6 of the Treaty on
the European Union recognizes that the European Union
founded on the principles of liberal democratic respect for
human rights, fundamental freedom, and the rule of law, and
provides for the accession of the European Union to the
ECHR.37 Article 7 allows imposition of sanctions.38
But no extension of the scope of application of
fundamental rights as a matter of EU law is allowed when it
comes to any Member State measure. Yet it cannot be denied
that respect for fundamental rights is intrinsic to the EU legal
order.39 One type of review is conventional: the court has
jurisdiction to examine whether Member States provide the level
of protection to fulfill their other obligations as members of the
Union, which flows logically from the nature of the process of
European integration. Another type of judicial review is
possible: jurisdiction to review any national measure in the light
34. Opinion of Advocate General Francis Jacobs, Christos Konstantinidis v. Stadt
Altensteig, Case C-168/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1 191, 1 46.
35. See id. 17.
36. See generally Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union,
supra note 13 (emphasizing the rights of citizens and individuals).
37. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 5, art. 6, 2010 O.J. C 83/13. at 19.
38. Id. art. 7, at 19-20.
39. See id. 1 19.
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of fundamental rights but this is ancillary."') It is possible that
fundamental rights are persistently breached in a Member
State." But only a serious violation impinges on free
movement.42 Those who do not fall under the competence of
the CJEU have to go to the ECtHR. 3
Setting forth the carefully nuanced opinion in outline form
places the limitations on justice in stark relief. Any rights not
protected are deemed less "serious." Nevertheless, AG Maduro's
opinion recognizes the importance of fundamental rights
whether traveling from one Member State to another takes place
or not. The legal commitment of the Member States in their
own constitutions to honor fundamental rights makes it clear
that more than traveling (the "freedom" of the EC Treaty) is at
stake. Thus, there is still a cross-border implication (1 29). * In
Guimont, the rules related to free movement but had no cross-
border element.45 Finally, the opinion recognizes the obligation
of Member States and national courts to deal with delays that
prevent the exercise of rights: national courts had better
scrutinize this delay.46
As far as Sheila McCarthy's case is concerned, Centro Europa
7 in 2007 is the proverbial canary in the coal mine, the early
warning sign that not all is well for the protection of Sheila's not
so "serious" citizenship rights, like residence in her own
Member State.47 Perhaps the Member State, which at least since
its preparations for accession to the EU and many times long
before that, has undertaken to protect constitutional rights,
does not wish to honor its commitments in every instance.
40. See id. 1 20.
41. Seeid. 121.
42. See id. 1 23.
43. See id. 1[ 24.
44. See id. 1[ 29.
45. See id. 30; Criminal Proceedings v.Jean-Pierre Guimont, Case C-444/98, [2000]
E.C.R. I-10663. 1 4 (fined in the Department of Vauclusc for offering Emmentaler without
rind for sale in violation of a 1998 French decree). The ECJ accepted jurisdiction when the
case involved no cross-border travel. Cyril Ritter, Purely Internal Situations. Reverse
Disc riination, Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 234, 31 EUR. L. RLV. 690 (2006) (explaining anti-
federalist position emphasizing the competencies of the Member States).
46. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 5, art. 7, 2010 0.J. C 83/ 13, at 40.
47. EUI Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies EUDO
Citizenship Obscrvatory, Has the European Court ofJustice Challenged Member State Sovereignty
in Nationality Law? (Dec. 2011, Jo Shaw, ed.), hLtl://cudo-citizenship.cu/docs/RS(AS
2011_62.pdf.
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Perhaps the Court is leery of committing to a full defense of the
Charter of Rights.48" Or perhaps in the process of the EU's
accession to the ECHR, the Court does not wish to create
jurisdictional duplications. Nevertheless, it thereby weakens
itself in Centro Europa 7, since the ECtHR itself is far from robust
and also suffers from deference to the signatory states to that
treaty. Lack of competence renders courts weak and fails to
protect citizens from their state governments when that becomes
necessary. The CJEU in this case looks more like the ECtH in its
wide accommodation of the Member State at the expense of the
rights in question that the complainant seeks to invoke.
Slightly more optimistic in her delineation of reverse
discrimination arising from the purely internal doctrine,
Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston has, just like Advocate
General Poiares Maduro, helped the CJEU to reduce "the extent
of the wholly internal situation doctrine vis a vis European
citizens. "4 In Gouvernement de la Conmunauti Frangaise et
Gouvernement Wallon v. Gouvernement Flamand, one of the several
questions that arose had to do with whether EU law ratione
materiae (by reason of subject matter jurisdiction) prevents a
region of a Member State from making grants of care insurance
(zorgverzekering) conditional upon residence in that region.50
Thus a candidate for the insurance scheme had both to live and
to work in Flanders because the Flemish government did not
mean to provide, for example, for a candidate who works in
Flanders but lives in Wallonia.
Advocate General Sharpston builds on the work of Advocate
General Poiares Maduro. Due to the unusual separation but not
divorce amongst the regions of the Kingdom of Belgium, she
has better facts upon which to craft her argument about what
48. Admittedly much of the activity in the McCaithy case took place when the Charter
of Rights was only a Declaration without force of law attached to the Treaty of Nice, 2000.
See Charter of Rights, supra note 5. Once the Charter became legally binding, Member
States limited the applicability of the Charter. See infra note 150.
49. Nicola, supra note 26, at 1297 (describing the invocation of a wholly internal
situation, which "allows Member States to maintain reverse discriminatory schenes
because they have no nexus to EU law").
50. Opinion of Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, Gouvernernent de la
Communaute Francaise et Gouvernement Wallon v. Gouvernement Flanand, Case C
212/06. [2008] E.C.R. 1-1683. See Thomas AJ.A. Vandarmmc, Case Annotation, 46 COMMON
MKr. L. REV. 287 (2009).
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really amounts to fundamental rights.5 Advocate General
Sharpston was able to make the transition in her reasoning from
market concerns of free movement to political concerns about
discrimination or the right to equal treatment. Therefore she
can write that, "at least potentially," the treaty's provisions on
citizenship challenge "the sustainability in its present form of
the doctrine on purely internal situations."52
The irony is that the only Belgians trapped by the schema
are those "who have not exercised a traditional right of freedom
of movement, but who have exercised (and continue to
exercise) a right to reside in a particular part of Belgium."51
Even more anomalous, this discrepancy arises "precisely because
[EU] law intervenes to prevent adverse treatment" of those who
exercised "classic economic rights of freedom of movement."54
In this case because only economic benefits were at stake, the
right not to move was easier to see than in Sheila McCarthy's
case. Workers who work in Flanders deserve sick benefits,
wherever they live. Advocate General Sharpston urged the CJEU
to abandon its traditional approach to "reverse discrimination"55
but even here she predicted that "the Court was unlikely to
follow her train of reasoning, which it actually did not."56 It is
51. Opinion of AdvocatC General Sharpston, Government of the French Comnunity
and Walloon Government, Case C-212/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-1683, 1 141 (explaining that
"the present case comes as close to a classic cross-border situation as a supposedly internal
situation can. It thereby highlights the arbitrariness of attaching so much importance to
crossing a national border"). Advocate General Sharpston points out "the self-
contradictory character of aimning at or completing an internal market while continuing to
attach importance to the crossing of national borders" (citation omitted). Id. 1[ 141, n.91.
But sureh that is exacth the point, that Member States cling to outmoded concepts
because the reservation of national competence leaves them with powers they arc more
than reluctant to lose. "Clearly there is a problem, including inconsistencies among the
cases. protection for citizens is needed without infringing on the role of the Member
States." Bogdandy, supra note 15, at 500. See Paul Craig, Competence and Mlenber State
Autonomy: Causalit, Consequences and Legitimany, in THE EUROPLAN COLRT O JUSTICE AND
THE AtTOOMY OF THE MEMBER STATES 11, 23 (Hans W. Micklitz & Bruno De Witte eds.,
2012).
52. Opinion of AdvocatC General Sharpston, General Sharpston, Governmcnt of the
French Community and Walloon Government, [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, 140.
53. Id. 151.
54. Id. n.103 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Carbonati
Apuani Sri v. Comune di Carrara, Case C-72/03, [2004] E.C.R. I-8027, 1 61-62).
53. SYBE DE VRIES ET AL.. BALANCING FUNDAMENTAL RI(,HTS WITH THE EU TREATY
FREEDOMS: THEL EUROPEAN CURT OF JUSTICE AS 'TIHTROPL' VALKER 22 (2012).
56. Menendez, supra note 29, at 383 n.150.
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more difficult to see that Sheila who has always lived in UK has a
continuing right to live there with her family because Member
States had always been in control of citizenship. Every Member
State might be upset not so much if Sheila received fair
treatment because of her EU lawsuit but because the Member
States jealously control citizenship insofar as it relates to the cost
of welfare benefits for the Member State, which in turn
interferes with the scope of Union citizenship.
B. The Dutv Not to Get so Far out in Front of the Judges that an
Advocate General's Opinions are Discounted or Even Disregarded in
judicial Deliberation
We expect to read opinions by Advocates General that are
more expansive in reasoning than CJEU judgments. Opinions
may contain arguments that go beyond the case to indicate the
possible direction of the law or the larger consequences of
following a principle. Judgments may prove more conservative
in their reasoning and holdings. In this area of reverse
discrimination concerning citizenship, Koen Lenaerts, Judge at
the CJEU, has explored "how the [CJEU] has determined the
existence of a cross-border element."57 Citizenship, rather than
simply being a fifth economic freedom, one for "economically
inactive free movers," may provide protection "in the absence of
a cross-border element," even in the context of Article 51 of the
Charter of Rights, a murky jurisdictional provision.58 The
following opinions by Advocates General illustrate narrow and
broad constructions of both Article 51 and the rights of EU
citizens.
In her opinion in Ruiz Zambrano, Advocate General
Sharpston suggested that in an exclusive or shared competence,
fundamental rights should be applied to the complainant's
claim.5 Ruiz Zambrano deals with a family from Colombia whose
57. Kocn Lcnaci , Cwis Europaeus Sum: Prom the Cross-border Link to the Status of Citizen
of the union. ONLINF JOURNAL ON FRFF MOVEMENT OF WORKERS HATFHIN THF EUROPEAN
UNION 6 (2011), avaiable at ec.europa.cu/social/BlobServIct?docld=7281&langld cn
[hereafter Lenacrl, Ciis]; Charter of Rights, supra note 5. art. 51.
58. See Lenaerts, Civi sura note 57, at 6; Charter of Rights, supra note 5, art. 51, 20 10
0.J. C 83/389. at 402.
59. DL VRIES ET AL., supra note 55, at 13; Opinion of Advocate General SharpsLon,
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Ofce National de l'Ernploi, Case C-34/09, [2010] E.C.R. I-
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first child, a son, was kidnapped by the guerillas for one week
before he was returned to his parents who then went to Belgium
and sought asylum.co Meanwhile, two more children, Diego and
Jessica, were born into the family in Belgium, which later denied
asylum although the family was not deported. The father had
registered his family as residents, continued to work, and paid
taxes and social security charges. His work contract was,
however, suspended which led to the litigation in the CJEU.61
Mr. Ruiz Zambrano is free of "the confines of 'market
citizenship'" which is based on the protection of the right of a
worker or recipient or provider of services to move from one
Member State to another, the quintessential "traveling man."2
The Ruiz Zambrano children did not move from one Member
State to another. Diego and Jessica Ruiz Zambrano are allowed
to be registered as Belgian citizens, even though no one has
moved within the Member States and the family has remained in
Belgium since their arrival from Colombia.
In her Opinion, Advocate General Sharpston "undertook a
thorough critique of [] case law [on citizenship] and
highlighted inconsistencies caused by the desire to expand EU
fundamental rights protection."63 The first question dealt with
whether a Union citizen can invoke rights derived "merely from
residence in one's Member State." The logical contradictions of
requiring travel as a trigger to rights of Union citizenship
become clear in points 86 and 87 of Sharpston's opinion. Thus
01177. Despite the fact that fundamental rights should be applied, Advocate General
Sharpston did "not think that such a step can be taken unilaterally by the Court" because
the Member States do not agree. Id. Azoilai suggests one rule of law in Ruiz Zambraro is
that whenever the substance of a citizcn's rights is at risk. Ar ticle 20 could be invoked. See
Loic Azoulai, A Comment on the Ruiz Zambrano judgment: A Genuine European Integmtion,
EUDO CTFIZENSHIP, avalable at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizIenship-new..s/457-a-
comment-on-the-ruiz-zambirano-judgient-a-genuine-curopcan-integration (lastvisitedApr.
4 2013) (arguing that certain fundamental rights could be qualified as crucial for the
enjoyment of citizenship rights). Member States disapprove.
60. Ruiz Zambrano, Case C-34/09. [2011] E.C.R. 1-01177.
61. Michael A. Olivas & Dimitry Kochenov, Case G34/09Ruiz Zanbrano: A Respectful
Re/oinder (U. Hous. L Cr., Working Paper Series 2012-W-1, 2012).
62. Kay Hailbronner & Daniel Thym, Case Law, 48 COMMON MKT. L. RLv. 1253, 1269
(2011).
63. Bogdandy, sapra note 15, at 500 (explaining that Advocate General Sharpston
used her Opinion in Gouvernement de la Communaute rangaise, Case C-212/06. [2008]
E.C.R. 1-1683, as a base to put tie cases and principles involving citizenship law into a more
coherent order).
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one hypothetical, assuming that the Ruiz Zambrano family had
to leave the Kingdom of Belgium at the end of the litigation for
a third country, suggests that Diego and Jessica could go to any
Member State consulate in that third country for protection and
aid, even if their citizenship did not give them a right of
residence in Belgium.
"Is this a purely internal situation?"64 To address this
question Sharpston examined the plain meaning of Articles 20-
21 TFEU. "It would be artificial not [] to recognize [openly]
that . . . Article 21 TFEU contains a separate right to reside
that is independent of the right of free movement. Accordingly,
I recommend that the Court now recognise the existence of that
free standing right of residence."65
In another, harder question brought up by the facts of Ruiz
Zambrano, Sharpston in a full and nuanced analysis saw much
greater difficulties involved in the implementation of "the EU
fundamental right to family life independently of any other
provisions of EU law."66 Although fundamental rights are
playing a more significant role as the European Union accedes
to the ECHR, the CJEU has nevertheless hesitated in some
otherwise compelling cases to apply fundamental rights. "The
Court has, however, applied limits to the scope of EU
fundamental rights-specifically, in relations to situations that it
has held fell outside the scope of EU law." A clear definition of
the scope of the law of fundamental rights is necessary, quite
apart from "the existence and scope of a material EU
competence." (1 164).
64. Advocate General Sharpston notes that several Member States and the
Commission deem this a situation "that is purely internal." Opinion of Advocate General
Sharpston. Ruiz Zambrano [2010] E.C.R. 1-01177, 1 2. Indeed, the "purely internal"
argument would logically be the main stance for any Member State wishing to avoid the
jurisdiction of the C JEU because purely internal situations are within the sole competence
of the Member States.
65. Id. I[ 100-01. "The Court attaches no significance to a literal reading of the
Directive. Its reasoning is inspired by the will to guarantee the effectiveness of the right of
residence of Union citizens through the protection of their fanily life." Anastasia
Iliopoulou Penot, The Transnational Character of U nion Citizenship, in FMPOWERMENT AN)
DISEMPOWLRMENT OF THL EUROPLAN CITIZENS 15, 27 (Michael Dougan, Nianh Nic
Shuibhne & Eleanor Spaventa eds.. 2012) (discussing Mletock). But for the current, more
cautious position the Court has now reached on family unification, see inja note 73 and
accompanying text.
66. Opinion of Advocate General SharpstLon, Ruiz Zambrano [2010] E.C.R. 1-01177,
151.
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Advocate General Sharpston exercised a broad
interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter, in a federal
approach, unlike Judge von Danwitz or Advocate General
Kokott.67 The Court avoided discussing fundamental rights in
Ruiz Zambrano, contenting itself with the broader Article 20
TFEU, which confers the status of citizen of the Union on every
person who is a national of a Member State. 8 The Court again
held, echoing Grzelczyk, that "citizenship of the Union is
destined to be the fundamental status of the nationals of
Member States."69 Member States cannot "depriv[e] citizens of
the Union of the subsequent enjoyment of the substance of the
rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the
Union."7 1o
Because her proposition would entail far-reaching
consequences for citizenship law and would embattle the CJEU
in the face of strong opposition from Member States, Advocate
General Sharpston suggested that the CJEU could not protect
the full concept of EU citizenship in Ruiz Zambrano.71 Bogdandy
emphasizes that even by following the Advocate General's 'result,
with which the Court agreed, the CJEU expanded citizenship
law over the serious resistance of the Commission of the EU and
nine Member States which intervened in Ruiz Zambrano to ask
for dismissal.7 2 Advocate General Sharpston knew the right thing
to do as far as fundamental rights are concerned but she also
knew that politically it is impossible for the Court to protect
fundamental citizenship rights. She forthrightly stated what the
law and the citizen need and what government prevents.
67. Id. 158; Thomas von Danwitz & Kitherina Paraschas, A Fresh Startfor the Charter:
Fundamental Questions on the Application of the Euopean Charter of Fundamental Rights, 35
F ORDIL4AM INT'L LJ. 1396. 1399 (2012); Koen Lenacrts. Federalism and the Rule of Law:
Perspectives ronm heEupean maion Court offustice, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.]. 1 338 (2010); Piet
Eckhout, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, 39 COMMON MKT.
L. RLv. 945 (2002); LenacrLs, Civis, supra note 57, at 18; infra Part IV.A
68. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 20, 2010 OJ. C83, at 56.
69. Opinion of Advocate Gencral Sharpston, Ruiz Zambrano [2010] E.C.R. 1-01177,
141.
70. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Ruiz Zambrano [2010] E.C.R. 1-01177.
71. Id. 1 171.
72. Bogdandy, supra note 15, at 503 (noting that "Union citizenship has become the
'new frontier' of EU law"). Searching for an understanding of this judicial risk-taking,
Bogdandy found it a likely explanation that the Court. in light of the multiple crises
Europe is facing, wants "to strengthen the legal concept on which the Union ultimately
rests." Id.
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Sometimes an Advocate General can only delineate the problems
without being able to set forth a satisfying solution acceptable to
the Court.
The Court in its judgment in Ruiz Zambrano introduced "a
new jurisdiction [al] test:" instead of travel based on free
movement, "the severity of a Member State's interference with
EU citizenship" should be weighed.7 In the end, however, this
interference "only precludes expulsion of a third country
national family member if this results in the Union citizen being
factually obliged to leave the Union's territory."74 In fact, however,
it is "very difficult to cross that threshold."7 5
If Advocate General Sharpston emphasized the injustices of
reverse discrimination, Advocate General Juliane Kokott focused
on the substance of EU citizenship within the confines of limited
competence for the Court. Thus, Advocate General Kokott took
an entirely different analytical approach in her opinion in Sheila
McCarthy's case.76 On the June 29th, 2010, not even five months
before delivering her opinion in McCarthy, Advocate General
Kokott spoke on the Charter at the European University
Institute.77 While important in its own right, her lecture, now a
73. Lenaerts, Civis, supra note 57, at 7. Lenaerts -supports the contention that Ruiz
Zarnbrano has emancipated EU citizenship from the constraints inherent in its ret
inovement origins." Id. Stanislas Adam & Peter van Elsuwege, Citizenship Rights and the
Federal Balance between the European Union and Rs Member Stats: Connent on Dereci, 37 EUR.
. REV. 176, 177 (2012).
74. " [T] he substance of Union citizenship is protected by virtue of Article 20 TFEU
[even] in the absence of any cross-border element." Bogdandy, supra note 15, at 503.
(citing Dereci, Case C-256/11. [2011] E.C.R. I, 66 (delivered 15 Nov. 2011) (not yet
reported)).
75. Id. at 504 (citing AcCarthy to the ellect that expulsion of a spouse did not fall
under the substance).
76. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, McCarthy, Case C-434/09. [2011]
E.C.R. 1-03375. The Directive 2004/38/EC does not cover McCarthy because she did not
move. She is not covered by the concept of beneficiary as provided for by Art. 3(1) of the
Directive. See Directive 2004/38/E( of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely
Within the Territory of the Member States, art. 3(1), 2004 OJ. L 158/77. TEU art. 21
does not apply if the citizen is confined in all relevant respects within a single Member
State. SeeTFEU, supra note 2, art. 21, 2010 0.J. C83, at 56-57; see alsoNiamh Nic Shuibhne,
The Third Age of EUCitizenship: Directive 2004/38 in the Case Law of the Court ofJustice in THE
JUDICIARY, THE LEGISLATURE AND THE EU INTLRNAL MARKET 331 (Phil Syrpis td., 2012).
77. Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
after Lisbon, EUI Working Papers No. 2010/06. Advocate Generial Kokott holds degrees
fron two distinguished American law schools, an LL.M. from Amicrican University and an
S).D. from Harvard University. Id. at 1. Furthermore, AG Kokott wvrote three important
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working paper, is particularly relevant to McCarthy. As the
abstract presages for her treatment of McCarthy's claim about
the scope of McCarthy's citizenship, "close examination of the
position of EU fundamental rights in the legal order of the
Union reveals that Member States are bound by these rights only
when they act within the scope of application of EU law. The
Charter of Rights does not alter this system. . . ." McCarthy is
not deprived under Articles 20-21 TFEU. Article 21 is directly
effective and grants a conditional right of residence to all EU
citizens but the TFEU Article itself provides that the operation
of Article 21 is subject to secondary legislation such as directives.
This jurisdictional pre-emption by the Member States arguably
prevents the court from having a free hand.78 Therefore, this
case is not like Ruiz Zambrano or Garcia Avello.79
Theoretically, Mrs. McCarthy's deprivation is centered on
her status as a citizen of the Union. But an "impeding effect" of
a national law deals with interfering in the citizen's right of free
movement. It is a positive development to restrict interpretation
of the expression "'national measures which have the effect of
depriving"' because "otherwise the Court would run the risk of
excessively loosening the requirement of a connecting factor for
the application of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, thus
disturbing the vertical allocation of powers sought by the
Treaties."s0
articles delineating her position on the relationship between Member State laws and
European integraion: Juliane Kokott, German Constitutional furisprudence and European
Legal Integration: Part 1. 22 EUR. PUBLIC LAw 237 (1996): Juliane Kokott, Gernan
Cons titutionalJurisprudence and European Legal Integration: Part II, 23 EUR. PUBi IC lAW 413
(1996); -, Report on Gernany, in THE EUROPEAN COURTS AN) NATIONAL COURTS 77 (Anne-
Maric Slaughter et al., eds. 1998). See BILL DAILS. RLSISTING THL EURoPLAN COURT OF
JU STICE: WEST GERMANY'S CONFRONTATION WTFH EUROPFAN LAWV, 1949-1979, 52
(Cambridge 2012).
78. TFEU, supra note 2. art. 21, 2010 OJ. C83, at 56-57.
79. Garcia kvello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-11613 (involving names
of the chiklren who had dual nationality. Parents got the sir name they wish in Spain but
Belgium would not accept that name. The Court said that the treaty requires Belgium to
respect the parents' request because chaos would ensue with their traveling documents).
80. Advocate General Sharpston had raised the issue of whether fundamental rights
can be "invoked as free standing lights against a Member State? Or must there be some
other link with EU law?" Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano
v. Office National de 'Emploi, Case CG34/09, [2011] E.C.R. 1-01177, 1[ 152. American
constitutional law provides two analogies that help explain some of the anomalous stance
in MNtcCarthy.
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Nevertheless, Advocate General Kokott had written her
opinion in Teixeira which, even though it requires the Member
State to provide benefits, builds on longer established case law
in Baumbast and on more favorable, older secondary legislation.
Ms. Teixeira,' came in 1989 from Portugal, at this point
divorced, and since her arrival, always remained in London. She
had not worked since 2005, acting instead as the primary care
giver of Patricia, who was born in 1991. Ms. Teixeira applied for
social welfare benefits (housing assistance), on the basis of being
the primary care giver of Patricia still in school;" she was denied.
It is a well-known feature of American constitutional law that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been used to apply
federal standards to the states. SeeAdam & van Elsuwege, supra note 73, at 185, n.59 (citing
GLOFFRLY R. STONE, ET AL.. CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw 729-35 (6th ed. 2009)). It is a lesser
known feature of American jurisprudence that when US Supreme Court judges do not
wish to follow such a precedent, they decide that one constitutional right is not enough to
warrant protection from the Supreme Court. The best-known use of this ploy was made in
Smith. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also
Catherine M.A. McCauliff, Religion and the Secular State: The First Amendment 58 AM. J.
Comp. L. 31 39 (2010). There the Court in effect said that free exercise of religion could
not be protected unless another right was also involved.
Smith relied on a new interpretation of the facts in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (that the enploycc's job was at stake as well as the free exercise of her religion) for
the proposition that employment as well as free exercise were involved and that free
exercise of religious beliefs was by itself insufficient to trigger constitutional protection,
although Sherbert itsclf set forth no such proposition. Thus, even with greater competence
than the European treaties allow the CjEU, protection for a fundamental right might still
be withheld. Popular backlash against Smith led to Congressional action to "restore"
religious freedom but in the end the restoration applied only to the federal government
after the Supreme Court declared the restoration act unconstitutional as applied to the
states. McC auliff, at 39-40, nn.34-36.
81. Teixcira v. London Borough of Lambeth, C-480/08. [2010] E.C.R. 1-01107; Peter
Stacup & Matthew Elsmore, Taking a Logical Step Fownard? Comment on Ibrahim and Teixeira,
35 EUR. L. REv. 571 (2010) (noting that these were school-age children of former workers,
therefore precluding the requirement of economic slf- sufficiency).
82. Patricia was then enrolled in secondary education under Baumbast, taking a child
care course in 2006 but her right lasts through tertiary education. See Bauibast & R v.
Scc'y of State for the Home Dcp't, Case CA13/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-07091. Mrs. Baumbast is
a Colombian who married a German national in the United Kingdom in 1990. She has two
daughters, a Colombian national and one with her husband who found employment in a
German company doing business in China and Lesotho. The Baunbasis owned a house in
UK and the child went to school in England but the family medical insurance was in
Germany. In May 1995, Mrs. Baumbast applied to remain in the United Kingdom. In
January 1996. the Social Security department denied her application; in 1998 she was
brought to the Immigration Adjudicator who said she did not work or have a right under
Directive 90/364 to reside in England. When this suit was initiated, Mr. Baumnbast was still
trying to get a job in te UK In the end. Mrs. Baunbas[ could stay because her younger
daughter was in school in the UK.
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Because she was not self-sufficient, Ms. Teixeira did not satisfy
the criteria for residence under the Citizenship and Residence
Directive of 2004.8, The new Directive involved the repeal of
Articles 10 and 11 of the prior (EEC) Regulation 1612/68.
Therefore an important issue in Teixeira is: does the new self-
sufficiency requirement now apply to Article 12? The CJEU
held, as in Baumbast, that an EU citizen who is not working and
does not have a right of residence any longer can still benefit
from direct application of Aiticle 21 TFEU.84 The Court held
that the right of residence is not dependent on self-sufficiency in
these casesA"
Advocate General Kokott stated in her Opinion that Patricia
has a right of access to education in UK because she has resided
since birth in that Member State. Thus the Grand Chamber
confirmed and extended the ruling of Baumbast that children
get the right to reside to attend general education, pursuant to
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68.86 Patricia can claim a right of
residence on the sole basis of Article 12 without being required
to satisfy the conditions laid down in the directive (having
sufficient resources and being subject to the maintenance grant
83. Parliament and Council Directive on Citizens Free Movement and Residence
RighiL, supra note 70. It stipulates financial requiremnenrLL and lisb types of family member
who may reside in the host Member States. Different articles of the Directive might have
covered Ms. Teixcira but as Advocate General Kokott famously noticed, Ms. Texciira
accepted that she was not cligible for permanent residence in the United Kingdom.
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Teixeira, [2010] E.C.R. 1-107, 1119-20. Nic
Shuibhne, supra note 76, at 355 (noting that Advocate General Kokott suggcsted the
consideration of other arLticles which might cover Ms. Teixcira). Art. 38 of Directive
2004/38 did not repeal Regulation 1612/68, Art. 12, 1968 O.J. 257/2. (A child gets her
right to education from Art. 12). Art. 10, which is deemed not related to Art. 12, was
repealed. If a child needs a parent during tertiary education, the parcnt can stay.
84. Teixeira, [2010] E.C.R. 1-107, 1 36-39.
85. Id. 1 67.
86. Baumbast, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7091. The United Kingdom invokes the public burden
exception so proportionality applies. Under the regulation, children can attend school.
Once a child starb school. (s)hc has the right to finish even if the parents later divorce or
only one parent is an EU citizen or the parent no longer works in this Member State and
the child is not a citizen of this Member State, the child can continue until graduation
fron the highest level of education appropriate. The primary care-giving parent can stay
with the child but not if the child is born after the parent is no longer working and living in
that Member State. The EQL held that an EU citizen who is not working and does not have
a right of residence any more can still have direct applicability of Art. 21 TFEU, then Art.
18. See David Martin, Comments on D'Hoop, Grabner, MRAX and Baumnbast, 5 ELR. J.
M IGRATION & L 143, 161 (2003).
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exclusion). The parent's right of residence does not depend on
a parent being a migrant worker on the date the child started
the educational program. Could the parent during all that time
therefore gain lawful residency during that time even without
fulfilling the three requirements in the Directive? Ms. Teixeira
does not have to fulfill Directive 2004/38 because her right to
residence stems from her role as a caregiver to her daughter
Patricia.87
A fair sampling of these wide-ranging opinions might
indicate that the CJEU has ample foundation at its disposal for
developing a solid jurisprudence on citizenship, family life and
integration. Basically, the division of positions deals with the
recognition of fundamental rights embedded in EU
considerations of citizenship and the fidelity to the exception to
EU law expressed in a "purely internal" concern. This is in some
senses the same dilemma at the heart of van Gend en Loos. Had
the CJEU not chosen to expand then, this new legal order would
not have been developed. Today, however, by making the
applicability of Article 21 TFEU dependent on secondary
legislation, the Member States have specifically reserved for
themselves competence in the issue of what they deem the
purely internal treatment of an EU citizen and at the same time
undermine the commitment of the EU citizen to the Union.
111. A PERSONAL STAKE IN THE IENTURE OR CHOICE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR CONSENT?
A citizen of any nation today faces life in the modern
administrative state. Sometimes as in McCarthy, the regulatory
state bears down upon citizens imposing a sense of dissociation
from government that many persons, some occasionally and
others more frequently, feel whether it is from a nation state, an
international governmental organization, a city or the unique
legal order of the European Union. Here the McCarthys are
facing the undesirable choices of remaining in United Kingdom
without the husband and father of the family or moving from
the place the children and mother know and where all wish to
be to a place only the father knows. Such a choice is all that
remains open to them if they wish to keep the family intact,
87. Teixeira, [2010] E.C.R. 1-107, 1 67-70.
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once the United Kingdom has received judicial blessing to split
them up.
On the one hand, the administrative, or regulatory, state
(Zweckverband) leads to the legitimacy question8" The market of
free choice is less impartial than it is indifferent when it comes
"to how market situations affect individual lives. [The market]
overrides moral intuitions concerning well-being or justice that
might beset people when they learn about ill-fated neighbors or
friends."8 9 On the other hand, "[r]ational deference is the
bedrock of the administrative state. Its claim to authority rests
on the idea that insight into [people's] limited knowledge and
problem-solving capacity gives [them] a reason to yield to the
determinations made by expert bodies.""o Insofar as that is so, it
behooves expert bodies to address real problems justly in order
to avoid the anomie many citizens feel.
One thoughtful commentator on the meaning of
citizenship states that "the normative core of citizenship" is
88. van der Mci, Outer LIm.its, supra note 28. at 78-80 (expressing concern that the
ECJ's consideration of reverse discrimination would intrude into national competences
and put the court's legitimacy into question). For an example of smugness in the face of
inefficiency and possible injustice regarding claimans' rights in the American justice
system see Adam Liptak, Sidebar, N.Y. TiMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
tilestopics/pcople/I/adaimliptak/index.htmi (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).
In 2006,Justice Antonin Scalia stated that "Like other human institutions, cours and
juries are not perfect." In 2009, he wrote "chillingly but accurately" that the Supreme
Court "has never held that the C onstitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant
who had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is 'actually'
innocent." Adam Liptak, Case Asks When New Evid'e Means a New Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12. 2012. at A16. Thus even the right to life of an "actually" innocent man receives short
shrift fron the justice system in the modern adinistrative state seemingly without distrcss
and impetus to ind a better solution.
89. Alexander Somck, From Emancipation to Empowerment: The European Uhion and the
Individual. OF IOwA LEGAL STUD. RLS. PAPER SERILES (University of 1owa), Mar. 7, 2013,
No. 13-16, at 37-38 [hereinafter Somek, Emancipation]. See generally GOOD GOVERNANCE IN
E: ROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET (Christian joerges & R. Dehousse eds., 2002); THE LAW OF
THE SINGLE EUROPLAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES (Catherine Barnaid & J. Scott
eds, 2002). Francesca Strumia, Remedying th Inequalities of Economic Citizenship in Europe:
Cohesion Policy and theNegativeRight to Move. 17 EUR. L.J. 725 (2011).
90. Sonek, supra note 89, at 44-45. For further on this question of expert bodies see
Alexander Somek, Accidental Cosmopolitanisu, 3 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 371, 378
(2012) [hereinafter. Soiek, Cosmopolitanism] ("The presence of others translates not into
demands addressed to an already 'encumbered self 'but rathcr to aggregate effc that
constitute externalities. They require some regulatory response. Rational yielding to
regulations, therefore, is the key to understanding what becomes of citizenship-and how
collective self(etLrmiinaltion works-under conditions of accidental
cosmopolitanism. ... ").
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"collective self-determination. "' Citizenship implies belonging
and living in society. Thus, "as citizens, people have conceived of
themselves as part of a common world. This is the key to seeing
self-determination mediated by living among others . . . .one is
collectively autonomous if (and only if) one yields to those
others to whom one belongs." '9 In other words, the citizen
cannot live the mythical life of the Lone Ranger who fails in
some ways even to recognize the shadowy presence of Tonto, his
fellow traveler on the trails. In today's world, the citizen lives in a
market society, "subject to the incessant recurrence of smart
choices between and among non-chosen options. Advocates of a
free society do not see a problem in this. What matters to them
is that [so] long as one is not coerced into doing or forbearing
something one is free regardless of whether one finds the
options unattractive.""
A. The CJEU and the "Purely Internal" Doctrine
Indeed, the ELU citizen is a "market citizen" in the still-fluid
ambit of EU citizenship law.94 Nevertheless, the CJEU attempted
to render Union citizenship a new status, not dependent on the
older treaty freedoms of movement, by stating that the Union
citizen's right to move and reside in a Member State is a
91. Somek, Cosmopolitanism, supra note 90, at 4.
92. Id. A compeiling definition of citizenship was eloquently set forth for Americans.
"We are citizens. Its a word that doesn't just describe our nationality or legal status. It
describes the way we are made. It describes what we believe. It captures the enduring idea
that this country only works when we accept certain obligations to one another and to
future generations: that our rights are wrapped up in the rights of others; ... " President
Barack Obama, State of the Union Address before Congress, (Feb. 12, 2013).
93. Somek, Emancipation, supra note 89, at 29 (citation omitted). Somek opines that
choice may not be fathomable because unpalatable choices are presented as satisfing
society "perhaps, for the simple reason that in their view the value of choices resides in
choosing itself." Id.
94. Michelle Everson, The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEw LLGAL DYNAMICS OF
EU ROPEAN UNION 73 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995). klexander Somek,
INDIVIDUt AIISM: AN ESSAY ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 137 (2008)
(explaining that market holism involves "a vertical convergence between the Union's
regulatory power and the most fundamental freedom-more precisely, the benefits
associated with European citizenship.... [these rights] accrue without regard to whether
the subject matter is cxplicitly with the scope of the application of the Treaty"). Fe rdinand
Wollenschleger, A Aew Fundae ntal Fredom beyond Warket Integration: Union Citi -eship and
its Dnarmicsfor Shifting the Economic Paradigm of EUIntegration, 17 EUR. LJ. 1 (2011). Loic
Azoulai, The Cowdt ofJustice and the Social Alarket Economr: The Emergence of an Ideal and the
Conditionsfor its Realization," 45 COMMON MIKT. I. REV. 1335, 1337 (2008).
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different status from the older market notion of citizenship.9
AG Jan Mazak wrote that "Union citizenship, as developed by
the case-law of the Court, marks a process of emancipation of
[EU] rights from their economic paradigm."96
The Court in McCarthy recognizes in some sense that Sheila
McCarthv's situation is not a purely internal situation even
though she is not a traveling woman.9 7 But is Union citizenship
yet une nationalitj sans frontitres?" Not for Sheila McCarthy.
Perhaps the Union citizen is still a traveler but now the
reasoning behind the travel requirement is no longer the
market." Nevertheless, a citizen who does not wish to travel is at
a serious disadvantage in claiming certain EU rights.100 Rights of
residence are still struggling to break free of prior travel as a
trigger.10 1 What still attracts the law of EU citizenship to travel?
95. Martinez-Salav. Freistadt Berlin, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-2691. See Marlene
Wind, Post- National Citizenship in Europe: The EU as a "Welare Rights Generator"?" 15 COLUM.
ELUR 239, 243 (2009); Dora Kostakopoulou, Ideas. Norms and European Citizenship:
Explaining Istitutional Change. 68 Mo . RVF. 233, 239 (2005).
96. Opinion of AdvocatC General MazakJacqucline Foerstcr v. Hoofddirectic van de
Informatie Beheer Groep, Case (-158/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-8507, 1 54 (equal access to
educational funding).
97. Sheila McCarthy v. Sec'y of State for the Horne Dep't, Case C-434/09, [2011]
E.C.R. 1-3375, [ 42. The fact that Mrs McCarthy did not travel has no elect on
consideration of her situation as purely internal. Id. 1[ 46. See generally Mislay Metaija,
Internal Situations in Community Law: An Ucertain Safeguard of Conpetences within the Internal
Marke, in CROATIANYB. EUR. L. & POL'Y 31 (2009).
98. Segol6ne Barbon des Places. Nationalit des Etats Mlembres et Citaoennetg de l'Uhion
dans la Jwisprudence Communitaire: La Consecration d'une Nationalite sans Frontires, 18 RLv.
DESAXFFAIRFS EUt ROPEFNNES (2011).
99. Scholarly commentary and the jurisprudence of thc CJUE have addressed "purely
internal" situations unaccornpanid by personal movement, in particular the notion of
market freedoms as well as the political basis of Union acts. "At any rate, the legal doctrines
that the [Court] built aftcr Martinez Sala and Baumbast do necessarily imply a reduction of
the breadth of purely internal situations." Men6ndeLz, supra note 29, at 383.
100. Camille Dautricourt & Sebastien Thomas, Reverse Discrmination and Free
M4ovenent of Persons under Community Law: All for Ulysses, Nothing for Penelope? 34 EUR. I
RLV. 433. 434 (2009); Tryfonidou, supra note 28, at 63-64 (explaining that the Union aims
to ensure "that no discrimination arises as a result of the process of European
integration"); Niarnh Nic Shuibhne. Free Mlovem)ent of Persons and the Wholl Internal Rule:
Time to Move On ? 39 COMMON MKT. L. RLV. 731 (2002).
101. Myriam Benolo Carabot, Vers une Citoye net' Europnne de Residence, 18 REV. DES
AFFAIRLs EUROPENNES 7 (2011). Aftcr Ruiz Zambrano and MlcCarthy, it remained unclear
"whether the right of residence in the Union follows fron the right of 'novemnent and
residence' enshrined in arts. 20 and 21 TFEU or whether it belongs to a distinct category of
substantial citizenship rights that are not necessarily spelled out in one of the articles."
Anya Wiesbrock, Disentangling the "Union Citizenship Puzzle"?' The McCarthy Case 2011, 36
EUR. L. RVF. 861, 867 (2012).
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This attraction may come not only from the lingering idea of the
economic freedoms of the early community but also from a
"negative" rather than a "positive" conceptualization of rights.
The Court "still does not speak of a positive right to live in the
Union territory, it prefers a negative casting of the right not
to be forced to leave it."lo1
What is lost in the Court's negative application of the
principles of citizenship? In Derec, 1 os decided soon after
McCarthy, the Court said that the substance of Union citizenship
was not activated by "the mere fact that it might appear
desirable" for an EU citizen to live with his family "in the
territory of the Union." This finding was "without prejudice" to
the question whether the claimants could rely on the right to
family life.104 The referring court had to verify whether the case
fell within the scope of EU law, apply Article 7 of the Charter
and consider Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) ,Io harking
back to Carpenter.10a The CJEU continued its negative approach
in the Grand Chamber in Dereci, following closely on the
judgment in McCarthy:
102. Nic Shuibhne, supra note 10, at 366.
103. Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Murat Dereci v. Bundesministeriun flr
Inneres, Case -256/ 11, [2011] E.C.R. I1, (delivered Sept. 29, 2011) (not yet reported)
(holding that the national court is to decide this but (JUE gives them very little room to
maneuver). Advocate General Paolo Mcngozzi opined that the recent approach to EU law
and the substance of rights is not "limited to the case of minor Union citizens who are
dependent on one of their parents." Id. 1 46.
104. Dereci, [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered Nov. 15, 2011).
105. Charter of Rights, supra note 5, art. 7, 2010 0J. C 83/389; Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 13.
106. Dereci, [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered Nov. 15 2011) 1[1[ 68-72. Mary Carpenteri
applied for six months' residence as a visitor in UlK from the Philippines and did not
bother to apply to extend her stay. Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C
60/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6279. The old directive did not apply to Carpenter; arguably neither
does 2004/38. Advocate General Christine Stix-Hackl wvould have allowed Directive 73/148
to cover Mrs. Carpenter's situation. See Opinion of Advocate General Christine Stix-Hackl,
Case C-459/99 (delivered Sept. 13, 2001). EU law was more protective than domestic law
but the decision was criticized as an "internal" case. See infra note 104 and accompanying
text. Later she married Pcter Carpenter who had minor children and sold ad space in
continental magazines. Mary applied for leave to stay as the wife of a UK national but a
deportation order followed. She appealed. Mary looked after the children while Peter
traveled on the continent. The appeal tribunal asked for interpretation of Article 49. The
( JEU read Aitidce 49 in light of the fundamental right to respect for family life under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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[T] he mere fact that it might appear desirable to a national
of a Member State, for economic reasons or in order to
keep his family together in the territory of the Union, for
the members of his family who do not have the nationality
of a Member State to be able to reside with him in the
territory of the Union, is not sufficient in itself to support
the view that the Union citizen will be forced to leave Union
territory if such a right is not granted. 0 7
Despite these unfortunate words from the court, the role of
courts themselves in holding a society together in non-
totalitarian systems is generally positive, and that is true of the
CJEU as well. People are happy to put their faith in a neutral
decider who is not vested in the interests of one party or the
other. Thus a court does justice in at least two ways (1) by
serving the system; and (2) by providing individual justice
between the parties. Often individual, or retail, justice between
particular parties is deemed less important than clarifying
principles so that all participating courts in any judicial system
are operating in harmony. Insofar as a court is part of the
modern administrative state, the role of retail justice takes on
additional urgency in contributing to a less frustrating, more
legitimate experience for the citizen, for whom the government
should operate.
For the court system, McCarthy was a lost opportunity to set
forth the scope of EU citizenship. As Advocate General Kokott
stated in her Opinion in McCarthy, "EU law provides no means
of dealing with this problem" [when a citizen has not left the
home Member State].108 Therefore a Union citizen who has not
left her home Member State "cannot rely on EU law in order to
obtain for him or herself and his or her family members a right
of residence in the Member State in which that Union citizen
107. Dereci, [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered Nov. 15 2011) 1 68. In keeping with the
( EU's judgments in Mc~arthL and Derec. AG Yves Bot is clearly relying on the Member
State courts to protect third-country spouses froim deportation by the Member State of the
spouse who is an EU citizen. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, O & S, joined Cases C-
356/11 & Case C-357/11. [2012]. E.C.R. I 1 91 (delivered Sept. 27, 2012) (not yet
reported). See aLo Yoshikazu lida v. Stadt Uhin, Case C-4014 (delivered Nov. 8, 2012) (not
yet reported). Eight Member States and the European Commission submitted
obscrvations.
108. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, McCarthy, Case C-434/09, [2011] E.C.R.
I , [ 40 (delivered Nov. 25 2010) (judgment not yet issued).
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has always lived and of which he or she is a national."i 9
Nevertheless, Advocate General Kokott recognized that it was
possible for the Court "to derive a prohibition on discrimination
against one's own nationals from citizenship of the Union,"
noting that Advocate General Sharpston had already taken such
a reasonable position1lo The moment was lost due to the
objection of several Member States to a perfectly logical
position, as Advocate General Sharpston had showed, because
third-country nationals married however legitimately to
nationals in the home Member State would probably be the first
to be laid off in a recession and become dependent on Member
State social welfare benefits.
A few months later, in Dereci, the Grand Chamber of the
CJEU suggested that the national court could at least
theoretically see a way through this problem by the recognition
of fundamental rights, specifically the enjoyment of family
rights, subject to examination of the Convention."' For the
McCarthy family, however, the stakes were much higher: they
are denied a participation in the mutual government that is the
EU. In actuality they have no stake in that venture. Mrs.
McCarthy is, as other commentators have powerfully pointed
out, painted as exactly that, someone who does not work and
contribute to the society, her personhood virtually dismissed. "
Even her efforts at complying with CJEU categories, like
dual nationality do not receive mention in the facts of the case,
due in part as the commentators are careful to point out, to the
failure of the national court to write the statement of facts in
109. Id.158.
110. Id. 41, 42.
111. Dereci, [2011 ] E.C.R. I (delivered Nov. 15 2011) It 68-72.
112. See Kochenov. supra note 1, at 389-90. Mrs. McCarthy is in fact a brave woman
taking care of her own three children. one severely disabled, when families with greater
monetarv assets might have several home health aides or institutionalize the child. See
Shirley McCarthy v. Sec'y of StatC for the Home Dep't, Case C-434-09. [2011] E.C.R. I-
03375 ("Mr. George McCarthy is a Jamaican citizen who lacks lcave to enter or remain in
the United Kingdom. The object of the application for a residence permit under the
regulations is to enable her husband to obtain, as her husband, a residence permit under
the regulations on the basis that his spouse, the appellant, has one. He also was refused a
residence permit or residence card on December 6, 2004. In his case, the refusal was
accompanied by a notice that he had no further basis of stay in the United Kingdom. Mr.
McCarthy is not a party [o the present appeal but, if it were to succeed. he would be likely
to be granted the relevant permit.").
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Mrs. McCarthv's favor.'" The McCarthvs are left with the hollow
choices of "self-deporting" the other four members of the family
to join the father and husband in a new country for those four
or remaining in the country they know without George
McCarthy, husband and father of the family. By staying in
United Kingdom, Sheila loses both her husband and any income
her husband might have had now or during future employment
in United Kingdom, thus throwing herself completely on the
welfare state, which did not provide enough before the
deportation order for Mr. McCarthy.
The emphasis in the case that Mrs. McCarthy has not
moved from one Member State to another is used as a gate-
keeping function. She is not a traveling woman and therefore
does not trigger one of the four freedoms, such as the right of a
person to move from one Member State to another to receive
services. That inexplicably absolves the CJEU from examining,
or suggesting that the national court examine, the applicability
of the convention, although Advocate General Kokott had done
so in her Opinion.114 Surely the more relevant point about Mrs.
McCarthy's lack of travel is that she does not wish to leave UK, so
that the choice of self-deportation is in actuality no real choice.
While it may be deemed choice because Sheila McCarthy did
not lose her own citizenship, leaving the United Kingdom to stay
with her husband or remaining in UK without him is in fact
coercive. Her citizenship does not come with a right of
continued residence in her own Member State with her family
intact. This lack is a shortfall of her UK citizenship but because
113. See A. P. van der Mei, Comnbatting Reverse Discrmi nation: Who Should Do theJob?, I6
MAASTRICHT j. EUR. & COMP. I - 379, 382 (2009) [hereinafter van der Mei, Combating]
(taking the position that LUnion citizenship "is not a nagic judicial tool that can be used to
fix any legal problem of the nationals of the Member States"). Cutting down on the role of
citizenship makes presenting the plaintiff Mrs. McCarthy extrecmely difficult because the
equitics of her case revolve around her citizenship as a vehicle for keeping her family
together. Writers in the common law tradition have emphasized the equities of a party as a
basis for decision. KARL LiFWEiIYN, THE COIMON IAWv TRAIT)ION: )FCID)ING XPPEALS
(1960); Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the_ jde Restraint and
Freedom in the Corm)on Law Tradition, 71 Y4F Lj. 255 (1961); Aristotle, Nichomachan Ethis,
1137b, 12-29; Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 (AL L. RL. 467 (1988): Duncan
Kennedy. Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication A Citical Phenomenolog of Judging 36 J.
LFGm EDUC. 518 (1986); Patrick J. Rohan, The Common Law Tradition Situation Sense,
Subjectivism or 'ust Result"Jaisprudence, 32 FORDHAM L. RLV. 1 (1963).
114. Opinion of Advocate General Kokot, MlcCarthy,, Case C-434/09, [2011] E.C.R.
1 , 59-60(delivered Nov. 25, 2010) (judgment not yet issued) .
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of the line-drawing about what a wholly internally situation
means, it appears that EU citizenship cannot provide a remedy
because of the CJEU's limited competence to review violations
of fundamental rights. The CJEU, of course, must not insult the
Member State and seemingly ignores the situation. It also does
not take the suggestion of Advocate General Kokott to examine
the facts more closely than the present state of the record from
the Member State court allows.
In MlcCarthy, what did it mean that the court quoted "Union
citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals
of the Member States?"" The quotation should have required
the Court to face Mrs. McCarthy's fundamental status as a
citizen of the European Union and two Member States. " [ELvery
citizen of the Union must, whatever his nationality, enjoy exactly
the same rights and be subject to the same obligations."'6
Advocate General Georgios Cosmas has noted in 1 81 that the
drafters of the Maastricht Treaty used constitutional language by
referring to rights and citizen of the Union."1 In fact, the CJEU
distinguished the facts in McCarthy, reaffirming as in other cases
this fundamental status with its implication of fundamental
rights, both citizenship itself as a fundamental right and the
implication of other fundamental rights, to emphasize that a
citizen can get the same treatment under the treaty whatever the
Member State, subject to exceptions.118
115. Nathalie-Maric D'Hoop v. Office National de PEmploi, Case C-224/98. [2002]
E.C.R. 1-6191, 1 1 (quoting Rudi Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale, Case C-184/99,
[2001] E.C.R. I-6193. 1 31). Advocate General Leendert Geclhoed observed that "By
placing emphasis on the fundamental character of EU citizenship, the Court makes clear
that this is not merely a hollow or symbolic concept, but that it constitutes the basic status
of all nationals of EU Member States. .... " Regina ex parte Dany Bidar v. London Borough
of Ealing, Case C-209/03. [2005] E.C.R. 1-2119, point 28. Other cases quoting Grzelczyk
include Baunast and R, Case C-413/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7091, 82; Garcia Avello, Case C-
148/02, [2003] E.C.R. 1-11613, 1 22: Zhn & Chen. Case C-200/02. [2004] E.C.R. I-9925, 1[
25; Janko Rottnan v. Freistaat Bayern, Case C-135, [2010] E.C.R. 1-1449, 1 43.
1 16. Boukhalfay. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-214/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2253,
63 (Adocate General Philippe Leger emphasized the importance of equality of status for
each citizen of the Union).
117. Criminal Procedure v. Wisenbeek, Case C-378/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-6207.
118. Aftr the Maastricht Treaty was signed but before it cane into force, Advocate
General Francis Jacobs expressed the coning changes in rights, duties and the concept
itself of European citizenship in the powerful phrase civis europeus sum. See Christos
Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig, Case C-168/91, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
[1993] E.C.R. 1-1191. 1 46. The EU citizen "is entitled to assume that, wherever he goes to
earn his living in the European [Union], he will be treated in accordance wvith a common
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What is the exception here? Mrs. McCarthy's case does not
"provide the right context for detailed examination of the issue
of discrimination against one's own nationals."11 ' The
implication is that like Mary Carpenter, Sheila McCarthy did not
move from one Member State to another and that for the CJEU,
the complainant's staying in place may, ironically speaking, have
been a step too far for the Court. 120 In Mary Carpenter's case it
was clear that Mary committed no other offense than to fail to
make a timely application to extend her original six months'
visa. The anonymous critic ("the critic"), however, analogizes
the status of deportees to jail birds: " [T] he effects on family life
. . . are no different from a deportation order if a spouse has to
go to jail."121 If the parent is jailed, however, there is some
implication, at least, that the parent has broken a criminal law of
the Member State in question. In Mary's case which the critic
finds wrongly decided, there is no such situation. The analogy is
misplaced not only because Mary did nothing wrong but also
because the child can still visit the offending parent in jail
whereas the non-offender Mary would not be accessible to the
children.
code of fundamental values, in particular those laid down in the European Convention on
Human Rights. In other words, he is entitled to say "civis europeus sum" and to invoke that
status in order to oppose any violation of his fundamental rights."Id. See generaly Francis G.
Jacobs, Citiyenship ofthe European UTnion: A LegndAnalysis, 13 EUR. L.J. 591 (2007).
119. Opinion of AdvocatC General Kokott, AcCarthy, Case C-434/09, [2011] E.C.R.
1 1[ 43 (delivered Nov. 25 2010) (judgmcnt not yet issued). The Advocate General
describes Mrs. McCarthy as a "static" Union citizen rather than a "mobile" Union citizen.
Id. While much has changed in the law of EU citizenship, the model of the internal market
remains deeply imprinted. See Uecker & Jacquet v. Land Nordrhcin-Westfalen, Joined
Cases C 16496 & 5/96, [1997] E.C.R. 1-3171, [ 16 (citizenship rights do not arise in a
wholly intinal situation); see also Ferdinand Wollenschleger, The Evolution of Uhion
Citizenship between Judicial and Legislative Action, EU Studies Ass'n Conference, Boston, Mar.
2-5, 2011 available at euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/gd wollenschleger.pdf.
120. See van der Mci, Outer Limits, supra note 28, at 77, n.66; Anonymous, Editorial
Comments: Freedoms Lhlimited. 40 COMMON MKT. L. REx. 537 (2003). Note that anonymity
presumably allows the author protection from retaliation but it also prevents transparency.
It may conceivably strengthen the weight attached to the editorial, at least among the small
number of people who know the editorialist's identity starting with the editors at the
Review. The anonymous attacker uses quite strong language against the protection of
family life (as in effect the anonymous but influential editorial operates) although this
attack is said to be for other reasons, leaving the harm to the integration of family life as so
much "collateral damage" from the exaltation of a "higher" preferred value than an
integrated family life which simply get in the way, as children do when a bomb or drone
strikes the civilian area where terrorists may hide out.
121. Anonyinous, Editorial Comment, supra note 1120, at 541.
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After rhetorically criminalizing the deportee's status, the
critic opens the floodgates: "[A]n jail sentence for a service-
provider will have to be considered as a restriction of that
freedom, as the service-provider will be prevented from
exercising his or her right."'2 The critic suggests "the answer
the Court ought to give" in the following terms: "it is the
function of the freedoms to control and set limits to regulations
that hinder the integration of the markets of the Member States,
and not to guarantee economic and non-economic due process as
such."12 Would the critic return to the time before van Gend en
Loos, as the commentary quoted here suggests?
The critic of the Carpenter judgment suggests that while the
argument from Ar ticle 8 of the ECHR is compelling, it is
irrelevant in Carpenter because the ECHR was "not at the time
incorporated into UK law."12 The critic wrote in June 2003 that
if the ECHR had been binding in UK, "the deportation order
against Mrs. Carpenter would probably not have been issued."'12
Therefore the CJEU acted unnecessarily and incompetently
(ultra vires).
What about the timeline in Mrs. McCarthy's situation? She
and George McCarthy married in November 2002. Would the
critic of Carpenter have imagined that the Secretary of State who
issued the deportation order for Mr. McCarthy and the
immigration Adjudicator who dismissed Mr. McCarthy's appeal
would have acted differently because by that time the United
Kingdom had incorporated the ECHR into UK law, therefore
binding UK to comply with its articles? In any event, although
the United Kingdom failed to comply with Article 8, the critic, if
writing when the decisions were taken in Mrs. McCarthy's
situation, these decisions would no doubt still have been
122. Id. at 541-42.
123. Id. at 542 (emphasis added); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (giving
the development of the preliminary reference procedure in individual persons' cases).
124. Id. at 540, n.17.
125. Id. at 540; see also Paul Craig, The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual
Analysis 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 395 (2011) (explaining that the court inust follow the
coiptLence given it in the treatics). Note that the UK has not changed its position ol
immigration despite the Charter. See Cassell 11ryan-Low & Nicholas Winning, UK Plans to
Limit Immigrant Benefits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1913, at A9 (explaining that the anti-EU
Independence Party (UKIP) even refuses to recognize other EU nationals such as
Bulgarians and Romanians).
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irrelevant because the CJEU in 2003 had not the competence to
enforce the Charter of Rights in any circumstances.12 6 The
Charter of Rights was not then binding on the European Union
or therefore on signatories to what later became part of the
Treaty of Lisbon. In fact this same argument was made by later
critics.
In her opinion in McCarthy, Advocate General Kokott wrote
that "citizenship of the Union is not intended to extend the
scope ratione materiae of EU law to internal situations which have
no link to EU law."2 Peter Carpenter's travel is duly noted in
Carpenter, although in the context that Mary, who does not
travel, is enabling Peter to travel by providing a stable home life
for the children. That allows his third-country national wife to
stay in the United Kingdom. Mary and Sheila were not traveling
women but the new Maastricht citizenship of 1992 marks a time
when, metaphorically speaking, the hunter-gatherers of the
internal market can settle down like farmers of old.' The
democratic deficits of cases that might have given better retail
justice as well as clarified the proper scope of the law are not
often invoked. The ensuing confusion about the nature of
citizenship (and concomitantly Sheila McCarthy's inability to
claim her fundamental rights to respect for her family life),
however, constitutes a large enough problem that it should not
simply be treated as an inevitable cost of the system.
Carpenter and Ruiz Zambrano should have controlled
MVcCarthy. What is different in McCarthy? The consequences of
failures in government fall on citizens. The European
Commission had worked on a Directive on family
reunification.12 9 In an early draft that Directive had a provision
to cover people like Mrs. McCarthy who did not travel outside
her own Member State and had married a third-county
126. e infra note 145 and accompanying text (giving a discussion of the present
applicability of the Charter of Rights).
127. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, WcCarthy, Case C-434/09, [2011] E.C.R.
I-. 1[ 41 (delivered Nov. 2, 2010) (judgnent not yet issued).
128. See.Jo Shaw. U Ciizenship and Political Rights in an Evolving European Union, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2549, 2576--77 (2007).
129. Directive 2003/86 [2003] 0J. L251/12 deals with third-country nationals, but
only if they have residence permits. That lcaves Out Mr. McCarlhy who wanted to get a
residence permit.
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national. 1so Whether agreement was not possible or whether it
was simply an administrative decision to leave non-traveling
citizens and their third-country national spouses for the
Citizenship Directive, no provision to cover Mrs. McCarthy's
situation was ultimately included in the Directive on family
reunification. Mrs. McCarthy suffered the consequences by
being given only disturbing choices (to follow her husband to
his home country which her husband had previously left or to
break up her family and remain without her husband) , 1 Future
Mrs. McCarthys will continue to pay the same price "so long as
there is no further harmonisation of the rules on family
reunification at EU level."'2
B. The Role of the Member States and the Reaction of the C/EU
Immigration and the solvency of immigrants have always
concerned the Member States, often with prejudice to people
having different traditions and cultures.' Financial self-
sufficiency is particularly relevant to immigration departments
because family reunification is the most frequently given reason
130. See Nathan C'ambien, The Impact of U ion Citizenship on wemb State Im nigration
Laws: Some Potentially Perverse Side-Effects Resultingfrom Recent LCJ Case Law 28-29 (2012).
131. Directive 2004/38, supra note 76. See, e.g., Metock and Others v. Minister for
justice, Equality and Law Reform, Case C-127/08, [2008] E.C.R. 1-6241 (construing article
3 of the directive and overruling Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Akrich, Case C
109/01, [2001] E.C.R. I-9607 which required both spouses to accompany each other to a
host Member State rather than to meet there and then marry). If the CJEU had not
overruled Akrich, the usefulness (eflet utile) of the directive would have been lost and
affected Union citizens could not Icad a normal family life in the host Member State.
Nevertheless, Member States are politically displeased. See generally Cathryn Costello,
Mctock: Pree Movement and "NornalFamily Life" in the Union, 46 C ONFIVON MKT. L. REV. 587
(2009).
132. Adam & van Elsuwege, supra note 73, at 190. Nevertheless, the CJEU "has played
a central role in establishing a fundamental right to family reunification in Union law. The
Court has also extended the net of protection to third [-] country national spouses of EU
nationals, thereby lifting them out of the regulative confines of national, and often
restrictive, migration regimes," not. however, including Mrs. McCarthy and othier such as
those in Dereci, among those fortunate few. Dora Kostakopoulou, The Emropean Court of
Justice. Wember State Autonomy and European Union Citienship: Conjunctions and D.sjuncion,
in THE EURoPLAN COURT OFJUSTICE AND THE AUTONOMY OF THE MLMBLR STATLS 175, 186
(Hans W. Micklitz & Bruno De Witte eds.. 2012) [hereafter Kostakopoulou, Autonomy].
133. Cambien, supra note 130, at 15, n.51 (explaining that "there must be sufficient
resources for the Union citizen and his family members not to become a burden on the
social system of their Member State of residence. These resources could derive from the
economic activity of the non-EU parent of the Union citizen or from his savings").
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for immigrating to a Member State which always wishes to
protect itself from extra budgetary burdens,4 In George
McCarthy's case, dissolution is at stake for the family. Thus, "a
wide interpretation of the rights of Union citizens and their
family members in ECJ case law may well lead the Member
States to restrict their nationality rules and immigration
rules." S It is well known that Member States are willing to treat
their own citizens who have not traveled to another Member
State less favorably than EU citizens from other Member States
by limiting their rights in the area of family reunification.13 6
"However, the unfortunate human consequences of these
limits should not be overestimated in practice."13 People in Mrs.
McCarthv's situation in the future "may be stimulated to make
use of their free movement rights in order to benefit from the
right to family reunification under the conditions laid down in
the Citizenship Directive, and, hence, to circumvent the often
more restrictive requirements applicable under national law."'",
This would be "[m]ovement exclusively and artificially
motivated by the attempt to circumvent the application of
domestic norms,"'' 9 encouraged by the CJEU which cannot now
do justice to the few (or more likely many) people in Mrs.
McCarthy's situation. Traveling to another Member State may
prove more feasible for others than it would have been for Mrs.
McCarthy herself with a severely disabled child or for others with
other disincentives to travel. "This situation, where movement
within the territory of the Union almost becomes a practical
134. Id at 21, n.76.
135. Id. at 24 (explaining that Member States resist a wvide interpretation of the rights
of Union citizens and their family membeirs in E(J case law "because they fear that the
Court thereby opens the 'floodgates' and renders it impossible for thern to control
immigration, resulting in significant and uncontrollable financial burdens," citing Metock,
Case C-127/08. [2008] E.C.R. I-6241, 1 70-71). Id. at 23-24. n.85: see also Bernard Ryan,
The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland, 6 EUR.J. MIGRATION & L.
173 (2004) (giving an example of a Member State taking measures to prevent its exposure
to liability for the social sevices immigrants might need); Cambien, supra note 124, at 17-
23 (providing an example in Belgium).
136. See Cambien, supra note 130, at 25.
137. Adam & van Elsuwege, supra note 73. at 182.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 183, nn.37-38 (citing Dautricourt, supra note 94).
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obligation instead of right, inevitably raises the issue of a potential
abuse of the rights attached to EU citizenship."14 1o
Substantively speaking, the CJEU has stepped back from
Carpenter where it said that "the separation of Mr. and Mrs.
Carpenter would be detrimental to their family life and,
therefore, to the conditions under which Mr. Carpenter
exercises a fundamental freedom."141 Carpenter had protected
the complainant's right to family life in an arguably purely
internal situation: "the recent case law seems to follow a more
cautious approach" and that caution would prevent Carpenter
from controlling icCarthy.142 Mary Carpenter did not travel to
other Member States but Peter did. "By introducing a high
threshold for satisfying the requirement of a link with EU law in
purely internal situations," McCarthy limits Carpenter and Ruiz
Zambrano.143
What is the reason for the court's retreat? According to
Judge Lenaerts:
[The court] has opted for a restrictive interpretation of the
expression 'national measures which have the effect of
depriving . . . .' in my view, this is a positive development,
since otherwise the CJEU would run the risk of excessively
loosening the requirement of a connecting factor for the
application of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, thus
140. Id. at 182-83.
141. See Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case CAi6/00, [2002] E.C.R.
I-6279, 1[ 39: see also Silvia Acierno, The Carpenter Judgment Fundamental Rights and the
Limits of the Community Legal Order. 28 EUR. L. Rv. 398. 400, 402 (2003) (noting that the
Immigration Adjudicator's "decision to deport Mrs. Carpenter constitutes an interference
wit the exercise by Mr. Carpenter of his right to respect for his family life within the
meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR"). The Court held that the decision to deport Mrs.
Carpenter "does not strike a fair balance between the competing interests, that is, on the
one hand, the right of Mr. Carpenter to respect for his family life, and on the othier hand,
the maintenance of public order and public safety." Carpenter. [2002] E.C.R. I-6279. 1 43.
142. See von Danwitz, supra note 67, at 1407 (citing J.McB. v. L.E., Case C-400/10,
[2010] E.C.R. 1 (delivered Oct. 5. 2010) (not yet reported); Gucye & Saleiron Sanchez,
Joined Cases C-483/09 & C-1/10. [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered Sept. 15. 2011) (not yet
reported); see also Claire Dekar, Comment J.McH. v. ILE.: The Intersection ofEuropean U nion
Law and Private International Law in Intra-European Uhion Child Abduction, 34 FORD-HAM1
INTI LJ. 1430 (2011) (commeting finher on thcJ.McB. case).
143. See Adam & van Elsuwnege, supra note 73, at 189.
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disturbing the vertical allocation of powers sought by the
Treaties144
How best to characterize the rationale for this statement?
Docket control is perhaps too cynical an answer and the role of
fundamental rights, despite the invocation in the Charter of
Rights, is still ambiguous in an environment long-dominated by
the concept of an internal market.145 Other possible reasons
include competence14 or separation of powers.'4 7
The substitution of lack of coercion for genuine justice
does not absolve the administrative state whether in the form of
national governments' immigration departments or the CJEU
itself, from enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the justice
provided to citizens. The trust in markets to arbitrate between
the citizen and the administrative state does not deliver the
legitimacy to which citizens are entitled in their justice system
and in government generally. "Lottery rather than logic would
seem to be governing the exercise of citizenship rights." 48 The
notion that the bureaucrats have misappropriated "our"
government is surely one of the factors that fuels the alienation
of those disgruntled people who are leery of any governmental
over-reaching. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine whether
the AG and the Court could have done something else to
144. See Lenaerts, Civis, supra note 57, at 18. That connecting factor in additional to a
fundamental right is necessary for the protection of the families of EU citizens who have
not traveled to another Member State, just as Scalia thought two constitutional rights had
to be at stake in order to protect religious freedom, even though it is included in its own
right in the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
145. The US Supreme Court has the writ of certiorari to control the docket yet in
Smith, Justice Scalia thought we needed two rights to trigger free exercise, despite the
wording of the first amendment ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
ofreligion, or prohibiting the fre exercise thereof"). See supra note 80 and accompanying
tcxt (giving addition contcxt to Smith)
146. See Cambien, supra note 130, at 32 (explaining that "an intervention by the
Union legislator would bolster the effectiveness of Union citizenship and enhance its
contribution to the European integration process. Sutch intervention would. however.
come at a large cost for the division of powers as it would mean a direct intervention in
some of the most fundamental competence areas of the Member States").
147. CommentatoLrs have alluded to "the complex balance of powers between the
European Union and its Member States following the entry into force of the lisbon Treaty
and the Chartier of Fundamental Rights." SeeAdan & van Elsuwege, supra note 73, at 176.
148. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Gerardo Ruiz Zamnbrano v. Office
National de l'Emploi, Case (-34/09, [2010] E.C.R. 14)1177, [ 88.
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prevent Sheila McCarthy, an EU citizen, a UK citizen and an
Irish citizen, from having to face the brutal choices of leaving all
she knew in her life or staying in UK and taking care of her
children without the presence, help and support of her
husband. " [I s the jurisprudence of the Court with or against
EU citizens? And this cannot just mean the transnationally
mobile ones."14
IV. A PROBLEM THAT DEMAANDS A SOL UTION: QUO VADIS, 0
CIVIS EUROPAEUS, 0 CIVIS EUROPAEA?
What is the real issue in Sheila McCarthy's case? Is it that
she is the citizen whose citizenship rights are not threatened in
this situation because Sheila has the choice of splitting up her
family and staying in Britain or going with her husband to
Jamaica and keeping her family together? In that way the family
and fundamental rights would be incidental. Mrs. McCarthy's
situation took place before the Treaty of Lisbon together with
the Charter was in force. Would it be any different if similar facts
occurred again after December 2009?115
It is unlikely that the Charter of Rights could make a
difference in the outcome of a case concerning a future Mrs.
McCarthy. Three important scholarly contributions to the
analysis of the usefulness of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights in resolving issues for real people, individual citizens of
the EU like Sheila McCarthy, are predictive of the outcomes in
149. Shuibhne, supra note 76, at 360, 362 (explaining that "[ilf securing the greatest
degrcc of protection for citizenship rights is considered ... the primary objective" then
"institutional or processariented" interests must give way to substance).
150. Carpenter was similarly decided before Lisbon so that the Charter was merely
hortatory but Peter Carpenter's very occasional trips to other Member States to sell ad
space in medical magazines served as a tenuousjurisdictional trigger and the ECHR was
invoked to emphasize that the citizen (Pecr)'s family life would be interrupted if his thrd-
country national wife (Mary) were not allowed to stay. See Carpcntlerv. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, Case C60/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6279, 1 41 ("The decision to deport Mrs.
Carpenter constitutes an interference with the exercise by Mr. Carpenter of his right to
respect for his family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November
1950 ... which is among the fundamental rights which, according to the Courts settled
case-law, restated by the Preamble to the Single European Act and By Aricle 6(2) EU, are
protected in Cormmunity law").
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McCarthy and Dereci.151 The three articles emphasize that the
interpretation of ambiguous wording in Article 51 should be
designed to protect Member States from worrying that the EU is
overreaching its powers. 15 That leaves the rights that citizens of
their own Member States might wish to exercise against those
Member States' restrictive legislation on the short side of the
stick. Legislative history shows that the Member States wanted
"to avoid a competence creep via judicial action" and that
therefore Title VII of the Charter of Rights encompassing
Articles 51 to 54 narrows the situations under which the Charter
of Rights may be invoked and even "determines how the
provisions of the Charter [of Rights] may be interpreted,"
therefore tying the hands of the judges behind their backs."
Advocate General Kokott acknowledges that the Charter of
Rights might be thought of as harmonizing "the fundamental
rights for the entire European Union" but treats that
interpretation as daring because in her opinion, "it is exactly
this comprehensive application which is not intended."154 As in
the Treaty of Rome itself, private parties are not addressed the
first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter of Rights, which is
far from democratic, thus contributing to the much-lamented
democratic deficit. That omission of a private right of action did
not deter the CJEU in the early 1960s as the most famous cases,
151. See generaly Kokott & Sobotta s note 77; von Danwitz, supra note 67;
Lenaerts, Civs, supra note 57. But see Exploring the Limits of the EU Chaier of Fundamental
Rights. 8 EUR. CONSTIL L. RL. 375 (2012) [hereafter Lenarts, Explofing] (providing a less
harsh stance toward individual citizens). Some scholars attempt to avoid the limitations in
Article 51 of the Charter by seeking a different source for fundamental lights so that the
court could avoid this limitation on competence or jurisdiction. See generaly, Kochenov &
Plender, supra note 1.
152. See Lenart. Exploring supra note 151. at 376.
153. See id. at 376. Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundainental Rights, 2007
OJ. C 303/02;see also generallyJason Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court ofJustice:
Taking Rights Seriously 29 COMMON MKT. REV. 669 (1992) (explaining that protecting
fundamental rights is not so simpic as honoring the family integity of the McCarthy family
but may simply be an instrumental grab for the power of a dilerent department of
government).
154. See Kokott & Sobota, supra note 77, at 6 (citing Ferdinand Kirchhofs article in
STAATSRFC.H UND POTIK FESTSCHRIF FIR ROMAN HERZOG ZUM1 75.GEBURTSTAG 155,
164-66 (Mattias Herdcgen ed., 2009) and rejecting his interpretation that all of the
Charter of Rights "rights, frecdomns and principles could benefit any citizen of the Union
under any circumstance").
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van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL, ringingly demonstrate.1 s
According to Advcoate General Kokott, however, the Charter of
Rights does not provide any scope of action for individual
persons because "the provisions of the Charter [of Rights] are
addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due
regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States
only when they are implementing Union law. "16 Although
Kokott rejects the most undemocratic interpretations157 of the
scope of the Charter of Rights and recognizes the
contentiousness of the positions, she is aware of being
influenced by the "German version" of the Charter of Rights,
which refers to the Member States' "execution" (Durchfuhrung)
of EU law. That implies ministerial action with little
discretion. 158 For Kokott, however, whatever discretion exists is
designed only to "ensure a uniform application of other
European law."1
Advocate General Kokott recognized the unfavorable
position in which that leaves Mrs. McCarthy in her quest to keep
her husband in the United Kingdom where they met and
married and where she always lived. Kokott acknowledges the
problem that someone who travels to the United Kingdom from
another Member State would be treated more fairly than Mrs.
McCarthy who was born in the United Kingdom (the problem of
"reverse discrimination").16o The Advocate General, however,
feels that EU law failed to cope with this situation of reverse
discrimination. Because it falls through the cracks, reverse
155. See LINDSLTH, supra note 9, at 137-38; Janck T. Nowak, Case Note, Case G34/09,
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office National de l'Empoloi (ONEM) & Case C-434109.
Shirley McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Homc Department, 17 COUNI.J. EUR. L. 673,
687 (2011) ("The Court's judgnent in Ruiz Zambrano has everything to become a classic of
EU law along the lines of Van Gend & Loos and Costa v. EAEL: it is short, bold and lacks
proper reasoning." (citations omitted)).
156. See Kokott & Sobotta, supra note 77. at 6; see also de Burca, supra note 5. at 137.
157. See Kokott & Sobotta, supra note 77, at 7, n.41 (citing Huber as considering the
wording of the first sentence of AI ticle 51(1) of the Charter of Rights as a reduction of the
application of the European Union's fundamental rights).
158. See id. at 7, n.41. Other versions of the Charter of Rights in different Member
States refer to application (aplicar (Spanish), mise en oeuvre (French) or implementation
(English) of European law). Id.
159. See id. at 7, n.41. "Thus, the Charter would not alter the scope of application of
fundamental rights protection under EU law, respecting the constitutional allocation of
powers sought by the authors of the treatics." Lenacrts, Exploring, supra note 151. at 376.
I60. Tryfonidou, supra note 28, at 64.
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discrimination is not addressable by EU law but simply leaves
Mrs. McCarthy and those who find themselves in her
circumstances in a catch-22 outside the scope of EU law with her
family discriminated against. 1 The CJEU can only deal with the
substance of citizenship.
Article 5 of TEU, the constitutional principle of conferral of
competence, "provides an explanation [for the CJEU's decision]
not to apply the Treaties to situations which are confined in all
relevant respects to a single Member State."'16 The current view
of the CJEU "is that it is first and foremost for the Member
States, either acting on their own or in their capacity as
members of the EU legislature, to address the problem of
reverse discrimination." 163 If the immigration laws of her home
Member State disfavor the unity of the McCarthy family, what
alternative does she have? She "may still rely on the judicial
remedies provided . . . by national law." 64
Lenaerts suggests that the "minority could try to enforce
the constitutional principle of equality" but recognizes that "not
all national courts are empowered to set aside national law
conflicting with the constitution."'65 Furthermore, even when
"the EU legislator lacks the powers to intervene," fundamental
freedoms and EU citizenship still apply at least theoretically,
even if they remain practically unenforceable. 166 Morally, narrow
conferral of powers on the European Union with respect to
citizenship must not be allowed to prevent justice for Mrs.
161L Contra Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Rutn Zambrano [2010] E.C.R. I-
01177 (explaining the opposite position from Advocate General Kokott's opinion in
McCarthy).
162. Lenacrts, Civis. supra note 57, at 8. Article 6 of TEU similarly states that "the
Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the
Treaties." TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 5, art. 6, 2010 0.J. C 83/13. Furthermore, to ensure
this outcome, unlike the treatics, "the Charter lays down binding instructions as to the way
in which it must be interprted. Article 5(1) TEU-which refers to Tite VII of the Charter
and to the explanations relating to it-stresses the importance of those instructions."
Lenacrts, Exploing supra note 151. at 376.
163. van der Mci, Combatting supra note 113, at 382. Nevertheless, "[a]s far as the
restriction of a Member State's nationality legislation is concerned the Union legislator
can, in principle, not intercvne." Cambien. supra note 130, at 30.
164. Lenacrts, Civis, supra note 57, at 9.
165. Id. In other words, the CQjUE requires that the deprivation in the Member State
legislation be more than "scrious inconvenience" to Mrs. McCarthy. "That effect requires a
de facto loss of one of the rights attaching to the status of citizel of tie Union." Id. at 17.
166. Id. at 10.
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McCarthy's family and those in the same circumstances in the
future simply because Member States disagree that "an
individual should be able to rely on the Treaty provisions on EU
citizenship in order to combat reverse discrimination, regardless
of whether his or her situation is confined in all relevant
respects to a single Member State."'17
Nevertheless, "the question of who is entitled to be a
member of the European citizenry" has not been subjected to a
process of "critical reflection" characterized by "incremental,
principled and transformative institutional change."'6 The
transposition and implementation of the Citizenship Directive
has been difficult.169 National political pushback against the
Directive includes such complaints as less national control over
passports, a broader conception of the EU citizen's family,
increased welfare budgets and less control over expulsions. 7 o
These complaints, considered achievements from the legal
perspective of those promoting the rights of individual human
beings against the modern bureaucratic State, are offset by "the
practice of exclusion of long-term resident third[-] country
nationals from the personal scope of Union citizenship." 1
Natural judicial conservatism shields the desire of the
Member States that "an ever closer union" continue to remain
as much an aspiration as a reality. Thus the recent [Nov. 30,
20121 full-court judgment on a two-tier project for ever closer
union gives the legislature an opportunity to participate in
rendering the European Union more democratic.'7 Ferdinand
Wollenschlager has explored the relationship between the court
and the legislature in contributing to a fuller legal definition of
the meaning of EU citizenship.T
167. Id.
168. Kostakopoulou, Autonomy, supra note 132, at 176.
169. Id. at 179, n.21.
170. Id. at 179.
171. Id.at 178,n.16.
172. View of Advocate General Kokott, Thomas Pringle v. Goverinent of Ireland.
Case C-370/12, (delivered Oct. 26, 2012) (on the Stability Mechanism for Member States
whose currency is the euro).
173. Ferdinand Wollenschlager, The Judniciy, the Legslature and the Evolution of Union
Citizenship, in THE JUDICIARY, THL LEILSLATURE AND THL EU INTLRNAL MLRKLT 302 (Phil
Syrpis ed., 2012).
EU CITIZENSHIP
In MVcCarthy and Dereci,174 the CJUE has, broadly speaking,
rejected the stance it had taken in Carpenter. As Wollenschlager
observes, the court uses formalistic reasoning with regard to the
citizenship directive.' 7 5 Is the presence of a father deemed
legally less important to a family when the Member State is still
willing after Carpenter to discriminate against its own citizens,
given the blessing of lack of EU competence? Mrs. McCarthy,
advised to follow Carpenter's artificial jurisdiction, filled out the
citizenship papers for the Republic of Ireland where her mother
was born to get her equivalent of Peter Carpenter's infrequent
travel to other Member States.
Similarly, Mrs. McCarthy's advisors would have known that
without traveling to the Republic of Ireland, Catherine Zhu, an
Irish citizen, saved her mother (a third-country national) from
having to worry about deportation.17 6 The baby was born in
Belfast with Irish citizenship in September 2000, at a time when
the Irish constitution provided citizenship for anyone born on
the island of Ireland, including Northern Ireland. Had
Catherine been born in England, she would not have received
UK citizenship because the doctrine of ius soli is not followed
there. Mrs. Chen's right is derivative based on her child's need
for care. If Mrs. Chen had had to leave the United Kingdom, so
would Catherine have had to accompany her. Thus she was
protected under Article 21 TFEU, unlike Mrs. McCarthy 1m
The accommodating and expansive approach to family
unity or unification in the European Union in cases from
Carpenter to Zhu and Chen and Ruiz Zambrano would have led
174. "[T]he compatibility of national measures which are not a means for a member
state to fulfill is obligations under EU law, with fundamental rights cannot be examined by
the ECJ [CJEU]. Recently, the ruling of the E(J in Dereci confirmed this point." Lenacrts,
Exploring, supra note 151, at 386.
175. This court uses formalistic language in both McCarthy and Foerster which
demonstrates the court's intention to accept the Community legislator's choices: [ilts
superficial proportionality test and its dubious reference to the said directive as the
confirmation of the court's findings ... underline the court's acceptance of the [Union]
legislator's choices and its reluctance to challenge" the legislator. Sheila McCarthy v. Sec'y
of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-434/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-03375; jacqueline Foerster v.
Hoofddirectic van de Informatic Beheer Groep, Case C-158/07, [2008] E.C.R. 1-8507.
176. Zhu & Chen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R.
1-9925. Admittedly, unlike the McCarthys, Mrs. Chen is well to do and is unlikely ever to
need social welfare benefit or public health care from the UK Id. 1 28.
177. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 21. See Catherine Barnard, Of Students and Babies, 64
CAMBRIDGE LJ 560 (2005).
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Mrs. McCarthy's advisors to expect a favorable outcome from
the facts of her case, a father being torn away from his children
with his wife left to raise them alone or a wrenching departure
for the family of five from UK The CJUE surprised not only Mrs.
McCarthy's advisers but also many scholars. 7 8 True, EU
citizenship no longer needs a connection with two Member
States unless a citizen has not traveled to another Member State.
Nevertheless, the formulation in AcCarthv is not a sufficient
status on its own to protect the McCarthy family. Her family is
allowed to fall through the cracks in Ruiz Zambrano, rendering
the reality of the protective doctrine powerless in many cases to
come.179 The element of surprise in such an important area of
the law can cause a boomerang effect, which the Member States
actually do not wish to suffer from. Besides the obvious lesson to
non-traveling citizens to borrow money to travel to another
Member State temporarily in order to seek services or
employment and thereby trigger EU citizenship rights, citizens
married to third-country nationals but too poor to borrow travel
funds may choose to go underground with their family
Since the McCarthy children would lose "only" the family
presence of their father and Mrs. McCarthy her husband, they
were not legally deprived of the "genuine" enjoyment of the
"substance" of their citizenship. In this case, the elasticized
scope of citizenship is pulled tightly like a tourniquet. Use of the
value-laden words "genuine" and "substance" allows the CJUE
in defining the meaning of EU citizenship to demean, rather
than respect, the family life of the McCarthys.
The language implies that Mrs. McCarthy's family unity is
only an illegitimate, rather than a "genuine," consideration and
a peripheral value since she still enjoys the "substance" of her
citizenship even if she must sacrifice her residence in the United
Kingdom to keep her family together. At the same time the
court proclaims that it moved the legal meaning of citizenship
toward the reality of becoming the fundamental status for
178. "This is where the problem lies. We have no idea of what the cxact purview of
Union law is. It is in constant flux and it is very difficult to fix it at a Certan point in time.
There is no clear benchmark against which Court judgments can be tested." Nowak, supra
note 155. at 697.
179. The (,JEU's judgincit was thinly explained. See Niaih Nic Shuibhic. Seven
Quaetionsfor Seven Paragraphs, 36 EU1R. L REV. 162 (2011).
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residents of the Union. Enough families face difficulties keeping
their families together without the untoward interference of the
State or the complicity of the CJEU. It is hard to see the modern
administrative State willing to breach fundamental rights,
including family integrity, to save the payment of prospective
social welfare benefits. The damage the State does in this penny-
wise but pound-foolish approach may have many larger costs
repairing the psychological fallout and inherent instability from
a State-induced broken family than merely the greater economic
cost of the additional services a broken family will need from the
State.
Due to the division of competences under the treaties, the
court has exercised judicial restraint vis4-vis national
legislatures, especially in regard to the "wide margin of
appreciation" for Member States' stands on access to social
benefits. 80 The Member States will only accede to a treaty that
safeguards their powers not to recognize their own nationals'
fundamental rights in many instances. Accordingly, "national
ways of doing things" and "statal autonomy" have, in the cogent
phraseology of Dora Kostakopoulou, "often disempowered
citizens [like Mrs. McCarthy trying to keep her family including
her husband and disabled child in her home Member State]
and helped to justify the raw force of restrictive and coercive
practices [Mrs. McCarthy had the coercive "choice" of following
her husband to his home country which he had left or depriving
her children and herself of their father and husband]."181
CONCLUSION
While civis Europaea Sheila McCarthy is left in the
wilderness, deemed to be without a "genuine," substantive case
regarding the meaning of her EU citizenship, many other cives
Europaei are waiting in the wings, taking their chances for
keeping their families together into their national courts which
may refer cases with variations on those same EU citizenship
issues. Many EU citizens in Mrs. McCarthy's situation are now
learning that even dual citizenship without travel to another
Member State will not keep their families intact. They are well
180. Wollenschlagr, supa note 173, at 304.
181. Kostakopoulou, Autonomy,supra note 132, at 202.
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advised to borrow the money, if they can get the credit to do so,
to go to another Member State in search of temporary work,
however much they might not wish to face thatjourney.
For citizenship the next step of the CJEU is theoretically
either to integrate the Charter or reject the application of
fundamental rights in the treaties as expressed in the Charter or
Rights out of deference for a narrow construction of Article 51
as offering no new competence for the CJEU. Similarly Article
21 TFEU, which on its face grants a right of residence to an EU
citizen, is constrained. Article 21 is subjected to the limitations
and qualifications to be set forth into such secondary legislation
as directives. The difference in this case from the conditions that
obtained when van Gend en Loos was decided is that the Member
States have seen the CJEU in operation and have in the treaty
itself limited the jurisdiction of the CJEU. They wish to pre-empt
several choices the Court might otherwise have had in applying
Article 21. To "prevent Member States from depreciating the
concept of Union citizenship" and European integration as a
whole, the Court should apply the principle of effet utile
(effectiveness), as in van Gend en Loos, by declining to recognize
the doctrine of the wholly internal situation.'
One may well ask why was Ai ticle 21 written and
incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon? It looks as though
citizens' rights are being recognized but in fact as it stands now
the CJEU is constrained in its application of Article 21. The
Court may nevertheless be quite conservative and it in any event
might prefer this limitation on the doctrine of Ruiz Zambrano in
McCarthy. Or it may have embraced the step back from Ruiz
Zambrano so that the CJEU does not become a focus of
discontent for the Member States. We do not know because
their hands are tied. If all members of the Court actually agreed
with the Member States, it would still be good to know that is the
unfettered position of the Court. As it is, we only know that the
Member States have hedged about what would appear to be in
the court's competence with restrictions and, from the citizens'
182. Nowak. supra note 155, at 696 (citing Koen LcnacrLs & Kathleen Gutman,
Federa Common Law" in the Earopean Union: Compartive Pespecti, 54 AM.J. COMP. L. 1,
18-19 (2006)). "Why accept the application of the principle of effectiveness in one
Situation while rejecting it clsewhere? Good reasons sh o uld be advanced to justify a
distinction." Id. at 697.
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point of view, unpalatable or distressing conditions and
unattractive limitations to their EU citizenship rights.
Advocates General setting forth both the restrictive and
expansive approaches have contributed to the ongoing
development of the jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding EU
citizenship. The legal theories are already available for the next
step in the cycles of retrenchment and expansion as the times
allow. Part of the advantage for the system from having opinions
by Advocates General is the consistency each Advocate General
brings to his or her work over time in signed opinions, even if
different panels delivering judgments do not have this
consistency. Eventually, as the inconsistencies and injustices in
cases like McCarthy and Dereci are illustrated in clearer and
bolder relief, the CJEU may again be able to loosen its
constrictive language assessing the "genuine" enjoyment of the
"substance" of one's citizenship. This will not benefit Mrs.
McCarthy, but would provide relief in the future for citizens in
the same circumstances. A return to the spirit of Ruiz Zambrano
would be more in line with the Court's tradition of a rights-
based approach to Union citizenship. It would also give the EU
citizen, the person in society for whose service government is
established, more of the substance (s)he seeks from the courts
of the Member States and the CJUE alike.
Advocate General Sharpston expressed that spirit in her
opinion in Ruiz Zambrano:
The Member States have conferred competences upon the
European Union that empower it to adopt measures that
will take precedence over national law and that may be
directly effective. As a corollary, once those powers have
been granted the European Union should have both the
competence and the responsibility to guarantee
fundamental rights, independently of whether those powers
have in fact been exercised. The EU "is founded on the
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights." That
Treaty guarantee ought not to be made conditional upon
the actual exercise of legislative competence. In a European
Union founded on fundamental rights and the rule of law,
protection should not depend on the legislative initiative of
the institutions and the political process. Such contingent
protection of rights is the antithesis of the way in which
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contemporary democracies legitimize the authority of the
State. 183
183. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Gerardo Ruiz Zaimbrano v. Office
National de l'Emploi, Case (-34/09, [2010] E.C.R. I-01177, [ 165.
